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This paper empirically investigates the dynamics of price dispersion in retail fuel 
markets as a response to the corresponding wholesale price changes. For this purpose 
we take advantage of a daily dataset of prices fixed by gas stations in two Spanish 
regions. It is consistently found that retail price dispersion is temporarily enlarged as a 
consequence of wholesale price increases, while it is reduced due to decreases. The 
presence of asymmetries in the short-run dynamics is also revealed. The impact of 
positive changes in the wholesale price is, in the first days of adjustment, clearly 
greater. The dynamics pattern could be explained, at least in part, by the faster response 
of prices in the stations associated with the two vertically integrated companies that 
have the largest market share (i.e. Repsol and Cepsa). 
Keywords: Retail price dispersion; wholesale price variations; fuel oil markets.  






It is broadly recognized that geographical markets for liquid fuels display significant 
dispersion of retail prices in spite of the similarity of the traded goods, and even 
controlling for heterogeneity characteristics across sellers (e.g. Barron et al., 2004; 
Lewis, 2008). Consequently, a relevant number of empirical papers have been interested 
in knowing what aspects underlie this type of market inefficiency in the fuel industry. 
Indeed, different authors have explored the importance of aspects such as the 
information and search costs of consumers (Marvel, 1976; Adams, 1997; Lewis and 
Marvel, 2011), plant size (Roberts and Supina, 1996), seller density (Clemenz and 
Gugler, 2006; Lewis, 2008), and even regional borders (Balaguer and Ripollés, 2017). 
However, nowadays there is still a considerable lack of knowledge about how the 
common changes in marginal production costs, derived from regular variations of 
wholesale fuel prices in corresponding raw material markets, affect the dispersion of 
retail fuel prices.1  
The aim of this paper is to explore the pattern of time-varying price dispersion in fuel 
retailing exhibited after the common changes in costs. It is quite obvious that these 
changes could have an impact on the dispersion of retail prices, at least, in the short run 
unless sellers behave in a synchronized way. This can be straightforwardly illustrated 
from a simple Taylor-style staggered price mechanism (Taylor, 1980), where, after 
common costs variations, each kind of seller would adjust their prices at a given time. 
Then, dispersion of retail prices would firstly be increased as a consequence of positive 
(negative) costs changes if most sellers that adjust early have prices above (below) the 
price average in the market. Dispersion of retail prices could also temporally decrease to 
some extent. This last possibility could happen if, after a positive (negative) costs 
change, most of the sellers that move first have prices below (over) the price average in 
the market. Under this unsynchronized reaction, the dynamics of price dispersion will 
continue to the extent that the rest of the sellers have adjusted their prices in later stages. 
When all operating sellers have fully adjusted their prices, price deviation will have 
returned to its long-run steady state or it will have reached a new equilibrium level. 
                                                          
1 This situation contrasts with the existence of a related abundant literature about the relationship between 
price dispersion and inflation in different retail markets (e.g. Lach and Tsiddon, 1992; Baharad and Eden, 
2004; Caglayan et al., 2008). 
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Literature provides two reference papers on the long-run relationship between costs and 
price dispersion in retail fuel markets,2 suggesting that a new equilibrium level could be 
reached according to different levels of costs. Only one of them, specifically the paper 
by Chandra and Tappata (2011), provides direct estimates about the long-run effect of 
common costs on fuel price dispersion. In particular, by using daily data from the period 
January 2006 to May 2007 related to gas stations in four U.S. states,3 it is suggested that 
higher (lower) wholesale prices in the spot fuel markets involves less (more) retail price 
dispersion. So, a new equilibrium for price dispersion would be obtained after a 
variation in costs. This result is not surprising from the point of view of search 
behavior.4 That is, when retail prices fall, fewer consumers decide to search because 
potential gains are lower and retail price dispersion increases. 
The above finding is also in line with Lewis (2011), who uses weekly data for many of 
the gas stations operating in San Diego state between January 2000 and December 
2001. However, in this last case, how fuel price dispersion is affected by costs is only 
indirectly analyzed by alternatively linking the profit margins of gas stations with prices 
(in both retail and wholesale markets). Specifically, it is shown that in those sub-periods 
where fuel prices are relatively lower, profit margins are higher (and vice versa). Retail 
price dispersion is later regressed by OLS against the corresponding (lagged) profit 
margins. Results suggested that higher profit margins significantly imply more 
dispersion.  
To our knowledge, to date there are no empirical outcomes that, following common 
costs changes, formally provide the short-run dynamics of retail fuel price dispersion 
until reaching equilibrium. Moreover, as we have seen, with respect to long-term 
equilibrium, we have some early outcomes suggesting an inverse relationship between 
common costs and fuel price dispersion. They are very useful to illustrate the interesting 
                                                          
2 At this point it is also worth drawing attention to the paper by Lewis and Marvel (2011). Although the 
relationship between costs and price dispersion is not directly studied, the authors found an asymmetric 
relationship between retail prices changes and dispersion in gasoline markets. Specifically, results suggest 
that when retail prices are falling, the level of price dispersion (measured as price range for a city) is 
higher than when retail prices are rising or stable. 
3 The empirical analysis in this previous work further exploits the cross-sectional dimension of data to 
estimate the effect of the number of firms on price dispersion across local markets. 
4 But it is incompatible with other price-setting possibilities, such as that derived from the influential 
model of Carlson and McAfee (1983). In that model, common unit changes in costs are completely 
passed by all sellers, and price dispersion in retail markets would be unchanged. 
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theoretical predictions of specific search models in the two papers commented on 
above. However, the empirical relationship between costs and price dispersion that was 
obtained should be taken with caution in view of a lack of desirable unit root test 
analyses on the time series involved in regressions that led to this conclusion. That is to 
say, the empirical strategy used in previous papers, consisting in the simple application 
of the OLS procedure to estimate a regression model where time series are introduced in 
levels, would only be appropriate if they were stationary. Nevertheless, at least with 
regard to the wholesale prices in fuel markets directly used in Chandra and Tappata 
(2011), there is a lot of useful evidence that indicates that this might not be the case 
(e.g. Amano and Van Norden, 1998; Serletis and Herbert, 1999; Cologni and Manera, 
2008; He et al., 2010; Zavaleta et al., 2015). 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the framework from 
which we extract the data. We also describe the specific data employed and their 
sources. In Section 3 we analyze the stationary properties of the variables with the aim 
of specifying a suitable econometric model. In Section 4 we provide the results for two 
different Spanish regions in order to explore their robustness, and we perform some 
sensitivity analyses. Section 5 we attempt to shed some further light on the evidence 
about the dynamic pattern of retail price dispersion. Finally, concluding remarks will be 
given in Section 6. 
 
2. Framework description and data  
The retail distribution sector of transportation fuels in Spain is the context from which 
we obtain our data. Since the abolition of the CAMPSA monopoly in 1992, this sector 
has undergone a long process of liberalization. Among the large number of measures 
implemented since then (e.g. removing the minimum distance between gas stations, 
facilities for establishing stations in shopping centers and industrial areas), of particular 
note is the abolition in 1998 of the ceiling price regulation through the implementation 
of the Hydrocarbon Sector Act (34/1998).  From that date onwards, each gas station 
operating in Spanish territory was no longer subject to administrative restrictions to set 
their retail prices on fuel products or to transmit production cost changes. Despite this 
administrative freedom, the presence of vertically integrated oil companies (Repsol, 
Cepsa, and British Petroleum (BP)) and their supply contracts with associated gas 
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stations have allowed those companies to decide prices for a wide network of stations 
facilitating collusive agreements (Garcia, 2010). That is, on the one hand, price 
decisions are directly taken by wholesalers in the gas stations in which they operate (i.e. 
company owned-company operated (COCO) and dealer owned-company operated 
(DOCO)). On the other hand, there are other stations that are not managed by 
wholesalers but also sell under their brand and have exclusive supply contracts with 
them (i.e. company owned-dealer operated (CODO) and dealer owned-dealer operated 
(DODO)).  It is known that, by using these contracts, they have been indirectly forced to 
fix prices according to the strategies of the corresponding wholesaler. This practice was 
explicitly forbidden on 22 February 2013 (Royal Decree-Law 4/2013) in response to the 
fact that it constituted a widespread practice which was not consistent with the purpose 
of price liberalization. 
Two years later the complete liberalization of pricing, it became compulsory for all fuel 
retailers to inform the Government about their current prices (Royal Decree-Law 
6/2000). The aim was to provide the possibility for the public administration to 
disseminate information to consumers. This data can be found on the website of the 
Spanish Ministry of Energy, Tourism and the Digital Agenda 
(http://geoportalgasolineras.es/). We exploited the information provided by this website 
by collecting an important part of the data to be used for our empirical work. 
Data obtained from the above-mentioned website refers to daily diesel prices, location, 
and brand of each gas station operating in the Spanish autonomous communities of 
Madrid and Catalonia for just over four years (1 May 2010 to 26 August 2014). It is 
interesting to note that both geographical areas include an important number of gas 
stations, which is quite stable during the period under consideration. Specifically, as can 
be seen in Table 1, the number of stations in Madrid ranges from about 537 to 595, and 
in Catalonia from about 1,181 to 1,280. Many of those stations operate under brands 
belonging to the companies Repsol and Cepsa. In broad terms, during the period 
considered, about 45% and 32% of gas stations installed in Madrid and Catalonia, 
respectively, were associated with Repsol.5 Moreover, approximately 17% and 12% of 
                                                          
5 The company Repsol operates under the Repsol brand and two other brands (i.e. Campsa and Petronor), 
which represent a less important share of the sellers of the company in the two regions. According to data 
from the Spanish Ministry of Finance and Public Administration, on 28 August 2014 Campsa represented 
8.81% and 9.52% of the total number of Repsol stations in Madrid and Catalonia, respectively, while 
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the stations in Madrid and Catalonia, respectively, belonged to Cepsa. These firms not 
only enjoy a large share of the retail market and systemically set higher prices, but they 
are also vertically integrated.6 Finally, it is worth mentioning that BP is another 
vertically integrated company operating in Spain. However, the number of gas stations 
under its brand is much lower. Concretely, in the period considered, only an average 
proportion of about 10% and 4% of gas stations were associated with BP in Madrid and 
Catalonia, respectively. 
[Please insert Table 1 about here] 
In order to use retail price data in our empirical analysis, they are expressed net of tax 
according to the information obtained from the Spanish Ministry of Finance and Public 
Administration (see Appendix A for more details). We then calculate a measure of retail 
price dispersion from these prices. Specifically, the (absolute value of) deviation of 
prices in gas station i at time t with respect to the cross-sectional mean of prices for all 
the stations operating in the region at time t        . As a result, we have obtained 801 
and 1,651 time series for the said variable in the case of Madrid and Catalonia, 
respectively. We focus on all the resulting uninterrupted daily series during the 
complete sample period. That is, a part of the time series cannot be used since they 
correspond to gas stations that close on Sundays (89 in Madrid and 117 in Catalonia), 
while another part cannot be used because they started operating after the first day of 
our sample period (181 in Madrid and 386 in Catalonia) or closed before the last 
sampled day (106 in Madrid and 251 in Catalonia). Finally, the remaining gas stations 
(94 in Madrid and 531 in Catalonia) were subject to closures of short periods within the 
sample, which could have been caused by diverse factors such as renovation and repair 
works or holidays. Therefore, we use daily observations on retail price dispersion for a 
total of 331 and 366 gas stations of Madrid and Catalonia, respectively. 
Lastly, we also consider daily data on wholesale diesel prices in the international raw 
material market for the period mentioned above. This information is supplied by the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Petronor represented 0.38% and 7.67% of the total number of Repsol stations in Madrid and Catalonia, 
respectively.  
6 The companies Repsol and Cepsa cover 92% of the refining capacity in the country (according to the 
Spanish Competition Authority, 2014), and control 19.15% of the CLH group, the hydrocarbon logistics 
company dedicated to the storage and wholesale distribution of fuels in Spain (CLH, 2014). 
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agency S&P Global Platts, and specifically refers to quotations for refined diesel fuel in 
Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp, which is the reference spot market for North-West 
Europe. 
 
3. Time series analysis and specification 
We analyze the stationary properties of the variables underlying the study in order to 
specify an appropriate econometric model. For the set of time series corresponding to 
retail price dispersion, we conduct the heterogeneous panel unit root test proposed by 
Breitung and Das (2005), while for wholesale price series, we apply the well-known 
augmented unit-root test of Dickey and Fuller (1979) and the Phillips and Perron (1988) 
test. Table 2 reports the corresponding results for a model with and without trend. As 
can be seen, regardless of whether a trend is considered or not, they suggest that 
dispersions of retail prices are stationary. This contrasts with the results for the 
wholesale price, which appears to be non-stationary in levels although stationary in first 
differences. We cannot therefore assume a long-term relationship between dispersion of 
retail prices and level of wholesale prices. In fact, as is widely recognized (e.g. Stewart, 
2011), any significant association that might arise between I(0) and I(1) time series 
should be simply interpreted as spurious. However, we can consider that retail price 
dispersion may be affected by earlier changes in wholesale prices (i.e. first differences 
of wholesale prices). 
[Please insert Table 2 about here] 
In view of the stationary properties of the variables, and taking into account that each 
gas station will be able to freely pass wholesale price changes to retail prices, let us 
consider a simple heterogeneous Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) specification 
model such as the following: 
                                  
 
   
             
 
   
                           
 
   
 
where      is a measure of the dispersion obtained as the deviation of retail prices 
fixed by seller   with respect to the mean of prices in a geographical market at time  . 
The coefficient    represents the average deviation of prices fixed by a specific-station   
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which might arise from divergence in individual characteristics. Through this 
coefficient, we will then attempt to control for the existence of persistent price 
dispersion within a market, a phenomenon which is well established in the empirical 
literature (e.g. Lach, 2002; Lewis, 2008; Pennerstorfer et al., 2015).7 Moreover,     
measures the effect of lagged price dispersion on current price dispersion. Variable 
       represents the first differences of wholesale prices at time     (i.e.       
        . Specifically, this last variable has been split according to whether changes 
are positive (         or negative (        .      and      capture, respectively, the short-
run impact of positive and negative changes of wholesale prices on dispersion, which is 




The ARDL model represented in Eq. (1) is estimated for each geographical region by 
adopting two approaches. First, for simplicity, the random error is assumed iid and the 
Mean Group (MG) estimator of Pesaran and Smith (1995) is applied. Second, we 
complementarily adopt the Mean Group Common Correlated Effects (MG-CCE) 
estimator of Pesaran (2006) which, assuming a cross-sectional dependency form in the 
random error term, allows to control for (unobserved) factors that commonly affect 
individuals sharing concrete attributes. This extension could be particularly useful in 
our case where prices of each station could be influenced by the strategy of their own 
brand within the local market. In line with Eberhardt and Teal (2013), henceforth, the 
MG-CCE is carried out in practical terms by including as regressors the cross-sectional 
average within both brand and city of dependent and explanatory variables. 
Mean group-type estimators, which consists in performing the cross-sectional mean of 
the individual OLS coefficients, are especially well suited for panels with relatively 
large numbers of time observations (T). Further, as Pesaran and Smith (1995) 
                                                          
7 Interestingly, we could find price dispersion even within very competitive markets. Although more 
competition lowers dispersion by reducing markups on the more price-inelastic consumers, it also can 
have the opposite effect. As we can see in Borenstein (1985) and Holmes (1989), more competition also 




demonstrated, they provide consistent estimates in dynamic models with a high degree 
of behavioral heterogeneity among individuals, which seems quite appropriate in our 
case. In fact, a Hausman-type statistical test has been applied to compare the results of 
the mean group-type with those obtained by pooled OLS. For both geographical 
regions, we rejected the null hypothesis of behavioral homogeneity across individuals 
(with p-values virtually equal to zero).  
Table 3 shows the corresponding results obtained by both MG and MG-CCE, where the 
optimal lag length in the model has been selected by minimizing the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC). As can be seen, the number of optimal autoregressive 
coefficients is the same for both Madrid and Catalonia, and the number of coefficients 
associated with wholesale prices is similar.  
 [Please insert Table 3 about here] 
[Please insert Figure 1 about here] 
The effect of positive and negative changes in wholesale prices can be straightforwardly 
interpreted by calculating the cumulative dynamic multipliers from the estimated mean 
group coefficients. That is,         
    
 
 
     and  
       
    
 
 
   , where             and 
       is the estimation of price dispersion at time    . Figure 1 shows the 
cumulative responses of price dispersion over time, as well as the corresponding 95% 
confidence intervals.8 Although after controlling for unobserved common factors in 
MG-CCE the range of changes in dispersion is narrower than in MG, we can see that in 
general the dynamic pattern is quite similar for both varieties of estimates. Thus, 
regardless of the estimator employed, we can infer some interesting outcomes. Firstly, 
the cumulative responses have a similar shape for gas stations in both regions. That is, 
the results consistently show that positive variations temporally increase retail price 
dispersion, while negative changes temporally decrease it. Secondly, retail price 
dispersion varies quickly for about a week after wholesale price changes in both cases. 
Later, although with some irregularities, cumulative effects converge to zero, which 
implies that the dispersion of prices gradually returns to its stationary state. Thirdly, 
                                                          
8 Appendix B also displays a representation of the price dispersion responses according to the fixed 
effects estimates of Eq. (1) with clustered standard errors by both city and brand. The results are 
consistent with those presented in the main text of this section. 
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how important the effects are seems to depend somewhat on the sign of the change. 
That is, there is some evidence that the impact of downward changes is more moderate. 
Indeed, in the results from both estimators, the null hypothesis of symmetric effects can 
be rejected at the 95% level of confidence during three first days and on the eleventh 
day in Madrid, and through the first three days in Catalonia. 
 
4.2. Robustness checks 
In this section we conduct several sensitivity analyses on the empirical results presented 
above. On the one hand, we wonder whether the dynamic response in price dispersion 
might be considerably affected when price dispersion is evaluated within a more narrow 
geographical scope. Specifically, in order to build the (absolute value of) deviation of 
prices, we use two alternative definitions of geographical markets: citywide and ZIP-
code areas. In the first case, the Madrid region is divided into 80 areas, and the 
Catalonia region is divided into 174 areas corresponding to the respective municipalities 
where the gas stations included in our sample are located. In the second case, the use of 
ZIP-code areas implies an even narrower geographic market definition. Namely, the 
sample for the Madrid region is divided in 158 ZIP-code areas, while the sample for 
Catalonia includes 227 ZIP-code areas. Unlike considering the previous definition of 
dispersion for the whole region (i.e. Madrid and Catalonia), both alternatives are more 
in line with the definition of local markets adopted by other papers on price dispersion 
determinants in the retail fuel sector (e.g. Hastings, 2004; Barron, 2004; Lewis, 2008; 
Chandra and Tappata, 2011). 
For the sake of a simplified presentation, we will focus our robustness checks on the 
MG-CCE procedure in accordance to the previous Subsection 4.1. Represented at the 
top and center of Figure 2 are the estimations on the dynamics of price dispersion, using 
both alternative definitions of local markets (while stationary properties for the 
dependent variable and the detailed results of estimations are in Appendix C and D, 
respectively). As can be seen, the pattern displayed is fairly consistent with that 
obtained from the benchmark results presented above. That is, positive variations 
temporally increase retail price dispersion, while negative changes temporally reduce it 
although more moderately. However, as expected, the changes in dispersion that have 
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been evaluated within these smaller geographical areas are lower than those evaluated 
within each region as a whole. 
[Please insert Figure 2 about here] 
In addition, we also consider another measure of daily price dispersion as an alternative 
to the (absolute) deviation from the mean presented above. Specifically, we consider the 
standard deviation of retail prices for each region. This alternative measure sacrifices 
the valuable information provided by the variability of behavior across gas stations. 
However, it allows us to take into consideration all the gas stations included in the 
dataset, without eliminating those retailers that do not report prices for certain time 
periods. Representations of estimations by applying the OLS procedure are provided at 
the bottom of Figure 2 (and stationary properties for the standard deviation and the full 
estimation results can be seen in Appendix C and D, respectively). Once again, the 
pattern of dynamic behavior is quite similar to what we have found so far. Regarding 
the magnitudes of the estimated changes in price dispersion for each region, they are 
more congruent with those obtained from the MG estimator (Figure 1). 
 
5. Further analysis of the results 
5.1. Benchmark analysis 
The pattern identified for the dynamics of price dispersion responses is only consistent 
with the predominance of retailers that move fast within the group of expensive gas 
stations. That is, a positive (negative) wholesale price change would imply more (lower) 
temporal price dispersion to the extent that stations with higher retail prices react 
quickly. In this subsection, we check the consistency by exploring the individual retail 
price responses to wholesale prices in the different categories of gas stations. 
We begin by exploring the stationarity properties of our panel data. According to the 
unit root test (presented in Appendix E), the panels of retail prices of both regions are 
non-stationary in their levels but become stationary after taking first differences. In 
view of the fact that both individual retail prices and wholesale prices are I(1), we 
choose to specify a heterogeneous extension of the non-linear ARDL model developed 
by Pesaran et al., (2001) and Shin et al., (2014):  
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where   is the first difference operator,      represents individual retail prices during 
time  ,    is constant over time but can differ across each individual  , and, as in Eq. (1), 
        and                 respectively, positive and negative wholesale price 
changes. Moreover,                     and                     represent, 
respectively, positive and negative partial sum decompositions of wholesale price 
changes. In turn,    indicates the speed of adjustment of each individual   towards long-
run equilibriums. It is interesting to note that this baseline approach admits asymmetries 
not only in the short-run price transmission process of wholesale prices (     
 
    vs. 
     
 
   ), but also in the long-run cost pass-through (  
  vs.    ).
9 Lastly,     is a 
random error term.  
We first proceed in estimating the retail price responses by distinguishing between two 
groups of retailers, depending on whether their daily prices are above or below the daily 
cross-sectional mean of the region where they operate for 90% or more of the sample 
period. Table 4 shows the MG and MG-CCE estimates of Eq. (2) for Madrid and 
Catalonia, and for the corresponding categories of gas stations. The optimal lag length 
has been selected by employing the AIC, while the coefficients and standard errors of 
the long-run cost pass-through (    and    ) have been calculated by using the 
conventional Delta method. As can be seen, regardless of the region and group of 
retailers considered, the absolute values of the computed      statistics in the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration notably exceed their corresponding upper critical value 
bounds at the standard levels of significance. This suggests that there is a significant 
long-run equilibrium between retail and wholesale prices. Estimates indicate that 
wholesale prices have positive long-run effects on the equilibrium retail prices. 
                                                          
9 A great deal of research on fuel price responses only considers asymmetries in the short-run, 
disregarding the possibility of long-run nonlinearity. Some recent papers argue that possible pervasive 
long-run asymmetries should be tested rather than assumed (e.g. Shin et al., 2014; Greenwood-Nimmo 
and Yongcheol, 2013). In economic terms, long-run asymmetries would imply that the equilibrium of 
markup levels could depend on the direction of changes in wholesale prices. Interestingly, a relevant 
number of studies for fuel markets provide evidence in favor of this fact (e.g. Balke et al., 1998; Bagnai 
and Ospina, 2015; Pal and Mitra, 2016; Apergis and Vouzavalis, 2018). 
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Moreover, although the coefficients of the upward and downward pass-through seem 
quite similar in magnitude terms, the null hypothesis of symmetry (       ) can be 
rejected in all cases at the 5% level of significance. 
Finally, since price dispersion changes take place mainly along the first two weeks after 
variation in wholesale prices, in Figure 3 we present the overall responses of retail 
prices in Madrid and Catalonia throughout these first days. The corresponding 
confidence intervals at 95% are also represented. As we can see, there are remarkable 
differences in the dynamic responses of expensive and cheap gas stations. The 
cumulative responses of retail prices for expensive gas stations are higher during the 
period before reaching the long-run equilibrium. This means that, in average terms, the 
group of expensive gas stations changes their retail prices quickly, as expected.10 
[Please insert Table 4 about here] 
[Please insert Figure 3 about here] 
In order to further understand the dynamics of price dispersion, we can now attempt to 
find out which type of gas stations are the price leaders in the market. As was first 
proposed by Scherer (1970) and has been widely adopted in the literature since then 
(e.g. Ono, 1982; Eckard, 1982; Scherer and Ross, 1990; Revoredo-Giha and Renwick, 
2012), price leadership models can be classified into three types: dominant, collusive, 
and barometric. On the one hand, the dominant type corresponds to those companies 
that, possessing the largest market share in a given industry, have de capacity of taking 
up the price leadership position, while the minor firms act as followers, meeting the 
residual demand. Similarly, it is also possible that there are some principal companies, 
with higher market shares, which adopt collusive price leadership. In both cases 
(dominant and collusive leadership types), the price level is rather more monopolistic 
than competitive. On the other hand, the barometric type is considered as a benign form 
of price leadership, where the leader’s advantage is derived from its larger efficiency in 
obtaining appropriate information for pricing the products. In this last line, it has been 
highlighted that the firms’ ability to react quickly to new information obtained also 
increases the probability of becoming price leader (Pastine and Pastine, 2004). Finally, 
                                                          
10 In Appendix F we also show the retail price responses according to the MG-CCE estimations by 
alternatively distinguishing between expensive and cheap gas stations at city and ZIP-code level, in line 




it is worth noting that it is also possible to conciliate the high market power of a 
dominant firm or some colluding firms with the presence of barometric type leadership. 
Indeed, as Eckard (1982) indicated, those firms with larger market shares will be 
relatively better informed about demand conditions and are therefore more likely to 
practice a barometric type leadership. 
As seen in Section 2, Repsol and Cepsa, which are among the group of the most 
expensive gas stations, clearly have the largest share of sellers in the Spanish regional 
markets. In this sense, it would not be surprising if the Spanish fuel market was 
characterized by a leadership derived from Repsol’s dominant position, or even a 
collusive situation between Repsol and Cepsa. Furthermore, both companies are 
vertically integrated as in the case of BP. It is also reasonable to think that these 
vertically integrated companies could exploit their first-hand information advantage on 
fuel prices in wholesale international markets, and this information could be quickly 
transmitted from their corresponding decision centers to their associated stations. 
However, unlike Repsol and Cepsa, BP is excluded from the pipeline network that 
supplies fuel in both regions, and the number of gas stations operating under its brand is 
much lower. In this sense, BP is expected to have less information on the conditions of 
demand.  
Taking the above-mentioned into account, we then estimate the retail price responses by 
distinguishing between five groups of retailers. Firstly, we consider Repsol, Cepsa, and 
BP stations separately. Secondly, following the previous analysis, we divide the rest of 
the remaining stations operating in each region into expensive and cheaper retailers. 
Table 5 shows the MG and MG-CCE estimates of Eq. (2) for Madrid and Catalonia, 
respectively, according to this alternative division.11 Moreover, the resulting responses 
of retail prices to wholesale price changes with the confidence intervals at 95% are 
shown in Figure 4. As we can see, for both Madrid and Catalonia and regardless of the 
estimator, stations associated with Repsol and Cepsa react to wholesale prices in a very 
similar way. In fact, at the 95% confidence level, we cannot reject the same cumulative 
response displayed on many days until reaching the practical completion of the costs 
pass-though. The speed at which stations respond clearly contrasts with that exhibited 
                                                          
11 Again, the long-run equilibrium between retail and wholesale prices is significantly evidenced 
regardless of the region and group of retailers considered. Moreover, we can reject the null hypothesis 
        at the 5% level of significance in almost all cases. 
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by the rest of the gas stations. Indeed, under a decrease in wholesale prices, Repsol and 
Cepsa gas stations have completed about 50% of the pass-through between the fifth and 
sixth days in both regions. The same amount of pass-through would be completed about 
one day later in the case of BP stations, and about two to three days later in the 
remaining stations regardless of whether they are expensive or cheap. 
[Please insert Table 5 about here] 
[Please insert Figure 4 about here] 
Thus, our results suggest that the ability to set prices above the average is not enough in 
itself to become a price leader. The vertically integrated company BP does not seem to 
act as a leader either. Therefore, its facility to access information on wholesale prices 
and the ease in which it quickly transfers this information to final prices in its stations 
also does not seem to be enough to reach this position. The results consistently suggest 
that Repsol and Cepsa are the companies which act as leaders in both markets. This 
could simply be a result of the high market share they hold (i.e. collusive leadership), or 
it could derive from better information on costs and on demand (i.e. barometric 
leadership). The information on costs could be facilitated by the vertical integration of 
these companies, while the information on demand could come from their extensive 
presence in the markets. Although we cannot specifically say what the causes are, for 
the purpose of our paper we can indicate that the leadership position held by both 
companies is favorable to the dynamics of price dispersion found. 
 
5.2. Robustness check 
We check the robustness of the further analysis by extending the Eq. (2) to allow for 
possible asymmetries in the speed at which retail prices return to the long-run 
equilibrium. Concretely, in line with other papers (e.g. Bachmeier and Griffin, 2003; 
Balaguer and Ripollés, 2012; Chua, et al., 2017), the speed of adjustment towards the 
long-run,     is now decomposed into     and     according to whether wholesale price 
changes are positive or negative respectively. 
A representation of the retail price responses according to the MG-CCE estimations is 
shown in Figure 5 (and detailed estimations in Appendix G). At the top of the figure we 
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present the cumulative responses of expensive and cheap gas stations, while at the 
bottom of the figure we compare the responses for Repsol, Cepsa, BP, and the 
remaining brands which are subdivided into expensive and cheaper gas stations 
(according to the definitions in Subsection 5.1.). As we can see, the pattern of responses 
is fairly consistent with the benchmark results presented above. That is, on the one 
hand, expensive gas stations adjust retail prices significantly faster than cheaper 
stations. On the other hand, the stations belonging to Repsol and Cepsa respond quicker 
than the other stations, suggesting that both act as price leaders. 
[Please insert Figure 5 about here] 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper has examined the pattern of time-varying price dispersion in fuel retailing 
caused by the changes in common costs derived from the corresponding wholesale 
prices. To this end we have exploited a daily dataset from gas stations operating in two 
regions in Spain (Madrid and Catalonia). Empirical results are quite robust to the 
application of the analysis to both different regions. For both cases, it is found that retail 
price dispersion is a stationary variable. It contrasts with the statistical properties of the 
raw material price variable in level terms, where the usual tests clearly indicated that it 
has a unit root. Thus, given the order of integration for each of the time series in 
question, it was not reasonable to assume the existence of a long-run relationship 
between both variables. We have then explored to what extent changes in wholesale 
prices affect retail price dispersion in the short run. More particularly, we have 
attempted to identify the dynamic pattern of dispersion until returning to their steady 
equilibrium state. 
To this end, we applied the standard Mean Group (MG) and the Mean Group Common 
Correlated effects (MG-CCE) estimators to an asymmetric ARDL model. It has been 
consistently found that the frequent changes in wholesale fuel prices cause significant 
variations in retail price dispersion. Namely, wholesale price increases entail more 
dispersion, while dispersion is temporally reduced when they decrease. We have also 
found that, in general, changes in dispersion derived from wholesale price increases are 
markedly greater. These results are robust to the consideration of citywide and ZIP-code 
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areas as narrower definitions of geographical markets within each region. That is, 
although the levels of change of price dispersion within the most local areas is lower 
than in the whole of each region, which is quite reasonable, the dynamic pattern of 
changes in dispersion is similar. In addition, the dynamic pattern found is also robust to 
OLS application to the asymmetric ARDL model, where the standard deviation was 
taken as an alternative measure for price dispersion.  
From the dynamic pattern revealed we can infer that, in average terms, the sellers in the 
group of expensive gas stations move early or adjust progressively faster. This 
phenomenon has been empirically corroborated by comparing the average speed of 
price responses between the groups of more expensive and cheaper gas stations. We 
also examined which firms, within the group of expensive gas stations, exhibited the 
highest adjustment speed. A descriptive analysis on the data showed that among the 
most expensive stations are systematically found those associated with Repsol and 
Cepsa, which are vertically integrated companies and represent the first and second 
largest market share, respectively. We consistently found that sellers operating under 
both brand names adjust their prices far more quickly and practically at the same time, 
which is compatible with a certain degree of collusion between the two companies. 
Therefore, it is suggested that the price leadership position of both companies is behind 
the dynamic pattern of price dispersion revealed. 
In summary, this paper has provided empirical evidence on the short-run dynamics of 
retail price dispersion in fuel markets. In addition, we question the existence of a long-
run relationship between the level of common costs (measured by wholesale prices in 
raw markets) and retail price dispersion obtained by previous empirical work on fuel 
markets. We hope that, as more high frequency microdata on gas stations become 
available, our empirical work encourages more research with the aim of gaining a better 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics by time period and type of gas stations 
 
Average number of gas stations  Average price, expressed in €/liter 
(percentage deviation from the cross-sectional mean) 
Total Repsol Cepsa BP Other sellers  Repsol Cepsa BP Other sellers 


























































































Source: Authors’ own elaboration from data of the Spanish Ministry of Energy, Tourism and Digital Agenda. 
Table(s)
Table 2. Unit root tests 
We denote ***, **, * to indicate the rejection of the null hypothesis of non-stationarity at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels of significance, respectively. The optimal lag length (in parenthesis) is based on the Newey-West 
Criterion for the Phillips-Perron test, and the Schwarz Information Criterion for the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller test. The critical values are obtained from MacKinnon (1991). 
 Breitung-Das  Phillips-Perron  Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
Model with constant    
      in Madrid -40.036
***       
      in Catalonia -37.203
***       
      -2.122 (7)  -2.213 (1) 
       in Madrid -130.000
***       
       in Catalonia -95.010
***       
       -35.320
*** (7)  -26.529*** (1) 
        
Model with constant and trend 
      in Madrid -58.796
***       
      in Catalonia -46.261
***       
      -1.931 (7)  -1.937 (3) 
       in Madrid -160.000
***       
       in Catalonia -110.000
***       
       -35.323
***  (7)  -20.869*** (1) 
Table 3. Estimation results from Eq. (1) 
 Madrid  Catalonia 
 MG MG-CCE  MG MG-CCE 
   0.542
*** (0.005) 0.535*** (0.008)  0.630*** (0.005) 0.644*** (0.009) 
   0.105
*** (0.003) 0.098*** (0.004)  0.100*** (0.003) 0.061*** (0.007) 
   0.014
*** (0.002) 0.008** (0.003)  -0.005** (0.002) 0.004 (0.006) 
   0.038
*** (0.002) 0.034*** (0.002)  0.032*** (0.002) 0.008 (0.006) 
   0.007
*** (0.002) 0.001 (0.004)  0.011*** (0.002) 0.018*** (0.005) 
   0.016
*** (0.002) 0.002 (0.004)  0.010*** (0.002) -0.003 (0.004) 
   0.179
*** (0.004) 0.155*** (0.005)  0.175*** (0.004) 0.134*** (0.006) 
   -0.084*** (0.004) -0.071*** (0.004)  -0.091*** (0.003) -0.076*** (0.004) 
   -0.014
*** (0.002) -0.011*** (0.002)  -0.02*** (0.002) -0.007* (0.004) 
    -0.011
*** (0.002) -0.008*** (0.002)  -0.018*** (0.002) -0.011*** (0.003) 
    0.010*** (0.002) 0.010*** (0.002)  0.017*** (0.002) 0.012*** (0.003) 
    0.002 (0.002) 0.003 (0.003)  -0.007*** (0.002) -0.011*** (0.003) 
    0.007
*** (0.002) 0.010*** (0.002)  0.001 (0.002) 0.005* (0.003) 
    0.121
*** (0.004) 0.106*** (0.004)  0.124*** (0.003) 0.085*** (0.004) 
    -0.049
*** (0.003) -0.042*** (0.003)  -0.058*** (0.002) -0.039*** (0.003) 
    0.016
*** (0.002) 0.009*** (0.002)  0.024*** (0.002) 0.013*** (0.002) 
    -0.005
** (0.003) -0.001 (0.002)  0.009*** (0.003) 0.003 (0.003) 
    0.092
*** (0.005) 0.051*** (0.005)  0.092*** (0.007) 0.041*** (0.005) 
    -0.016
*** (0.003) -0.007** (0.003)  0.022*** (0.003) 0.016*** (0.003) 
    0.025
*** (0.003) 0.015*** (0.003)  0.045*** (0.003) 0.019*** (0.003) 
    0.033
*** (0.003) 0.017*** (0.002)  0.031*** (0.002) 0.015*** (0.003) 
    0.014
*** (0.002) 0.008*** (0.003)  0.027*** (0.003) 0.019*** (0.003) 
    -0.005
*** (0.002) 0.001 (0.002)  0.016*** (0.003) 0.012*** (0.002) 
    0.006
** (0.003) 0.008*** (0.003)  0.016*** (0.003) 0.007** (0.003) 
    -0.028
*** (0.003) -0.018*** (0.003)  -0.002 (0.004) 0.001 (0.003) 
     -0.011
*** (0.003) -0.007*** (0.003)  -0.015*** (0.003) -0.004* (0.003) 
     0.003 (0.002) -0.001 (0.003)  -0.008
*** (0.002) -0.001 (0.002) 
     -0.004
*** (0.002) -0.002 (0.002)  -0.011*** (0.002) -0.005*** (0.002) 
     0.015
*** (0.002) 0.007*** (0.002)  -0.002 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 
     0.004
* (0.002) 0.002 (0.002)      
    -0.027
*** (0.003) -0.015*** (0.002)  -0.018*** (0.003) -0.008*** (0.003) 
    0.003 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002)  0.001
*** (0.003) -0.002 (0.002) 
    -0.004
*** (0.004) 0.004 (0.004)  0.001*** (0.004) -0.005 (0.003) 
    0.017
*** (0.004) 0.010*** (0.003)  0.036*** (0.005) 0.013*** (0.004) 
    0.014
*** (0.003) 0.008*** (0.003)  0.038*** (0.004) 0.018*** (0.003) 
    0.026*** (0.002) 0.012*** (0.002)  0.057*** (0.004) 0.029*** (0.003) 
    0.005
*** (0.002) 0.002 (0.002)  0.032*** (0.003) 0.016*** (0.002) 
    0.017
*** (0.002) 0.005** (0.002)  0.03*** (0.002) 0.018*** (0.002) 
    0.008
*** (0.003) -0.002 (0.002)  0.015*** (0.003) 0.013*** (0.003) 
    0.014
*** (0.002) 0.007*** (0.002)  0.017*** (0.002) 0.011*** (0.002) 
     0.019
*** (0.003) 0.011*** (0.002)  0.019*** (0.003) 0.008*** (0.003) 
     -0.006
*** (0.002) -0.004** (0.002)  0.007*** (0.002) 0.006*** (0.002) 
     0.003 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002)  0.007*** (0.002) 0.009*** (0.002) 
     -0.012
*** (0.002) -0.006*** (0.002)  -0.014*** (0.002) -0.003* (0.002) 
     -0.005
*** (0.002) -0.002 (0.002)      
  0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000)  0.001*** (0.000) 0.001*** (0.000) 
Obs.  
(N x T) 
522,649  
(331 x 1,579) 
522,649  
(331 x 1,579) 
 577,914  
(366 x 1,579) 
577,914  
(366 x 1,579) 
Standard errors are in parenthesis. The optimal lag length has been selected by minimizing the AIC. We 
denote ***, **, * to indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Regressions 
include step dummy variables to control for changes in the Spanish VAT rate on fuels (1st June 2010 and 
1st September 2012), and the hydrocarbon special tax in Catalonia (1st April 2012). N and T refer, 
respectively, to the cross-sectional and temporal observations of the panel data. 
Table 4. Estimation results from Eq. (2) for expensive and cheap gas stations 
 Madrid  Catalonia 
 MG MG-CCE  MG MG-CCE 
 Expensive Cheap Expensive Cheap  Expensive Cheap Expensive Cheap 
   -0.292*** (0.005) -0.243*** (0.014) -0.280
*** (0.008) -0.241*** (0.013)  -0.253*** (0.005) -0.096*** (0.017) -0.248*** (0.006) -0.096*** (0.017) 
   -0.189*** (0.005) -0.121*** (0.008) -0.179
*** (0.007) -0.119*** (0.008)  -0.146*** (0.004) -0.026** (0.012) -0.143*** (0.005) -0.025** (0.012) 
   -0.194*** (0.004) -0.149*** (0.008) -0.185
*** (0.005) -0.147*** (0.008)  -0.161*** (0.004) -0.058*** (0.009) -0.159*** (0.005) -0.058*** (0.009) 
   -0.182*** (0.005) -0.135*** (0.006) -0.174*** (0.006) -0.134*** (0.007)  -0.145*** (0.004) -0.055*** (0.011) -0.143*** (0.004) -0.055*** (0.011) 
   -0.177*** (0.005) -0.110*** (0.009) -0.170
*** (0.007) -0.108*** (0.009)  -0.143*** (0.004) -0.044*** (0.008) -0.141*** (0.004) -0.043*** (0.008) 
   -0.157*** (0.004) -0.076*** (0.008) -0.151
*** (0.005) -0.074*** (0.008)  -0.118*** (0.003) -0.027*** (0.007) -0.117*** (0.003) -0.026*** (0.007) 
   0.122*** (0.008) 0.108*** (0.009) 0.123
*** (0.007) 0.110*** (0.010)  0.110*** (0.005) 0.037*** (0.012) 0.109*** (0.005) 0.036*** (0.012) 
   -0.052*** (0.004) -0.022*** (0.007) -0.049
*** (0.005) -0.022*** (0.007)  -0.022*** (0.003) -0.001 (0.006) -0.022*** (0.003) -0.001 (0.006) 
   -0.086*** (0.004) -0.037*** (0.007) -0.083
*** (0.004) -0.037*** (0.006)  -0.065*** (0.003) 0.001 (0.004) -0.064*** (0.003) 0.001 (0.004) 
    -0.110*** (0.005) -0.042*** (0.006) -0.107
*** (0.006) -0.043*** (0.006)  -0.085*** (0.003) -0.001 (0.007) -0.083*** (0.003) -0.001 (0.007) 
    -0.067*** (0.004) -0.034*** (0.004) -0.065
*** (0.004) -0.034*** (0.004)  -0.056*** (0.003) 0.001 (0.007) -0.056*** (0.003) 0.001 (0.007) 
    -0.073*** (0.005) -0.034*** (0.007) -0.070
*** (0.005) -0.035*** (0.007)  -0.056*** (0.003) 0.009 (0.007) -0.057*** (0.003) 0.009 (0.007) 
    -0.046*** (0.004) -0.014*** (0.005) -0.044
*** (0.004) -0.014*** (0.005)  -0.032*** (0.003) 0.004 (0.004) -0.032*** (0.003) 0.004 (0.004) 
    0.141*** (0.006) 0.114*** (0.008) 0.139
*** (0.006) 0.113*** (0.008)  0.119*** (0.004) 0.042*** (0.009) 0.117*** (0.004) 0.042*** (0.009) 
    0.039*** (0.004) 0.022*** (0.006) 0.039
*** (0.004) 0.020*** (0.005)  0.039*** (0.002)   0.040*** (0.002)   
    0.039
*** (0.005) -0.019 (0.015) 0.039*** (0.005) -0.020 (0.015)  0.046*** (0.004) -0.005 (0.005) 0.046*** (0.004) -0.004 (0.005) 
    0.018
* (0.010) -0.032** (0.014) 0.019* (0.010) -0.024 (0.016)  -0.002 (0.005) -0.009 (0.010) -0.007 (0.006) -0.008 (0.010) 
    0.299
*** (0.020) 0.079*** (0.022) 0.299*** (0.018) 0.081*** (0.022)  0.216*** (0.013) 0.044** (0.018) 0.212*** (0.013) 0.043** (0.018) 
    0.116
*** (0.010) 0.172*** (0.017) 0.112*** (0.008) 0.178*** (0.018)  0.108*** (0.006) 0.055*** (0.017) 0.105*** (0.006) 0.054*** (0.017) 
    0.225*** (0.010) 0.076*** (0.014) 0.219
*** (0.009) 0.078*** (0.015)  0.164*** (0.008) 0.030*** (0.011) 0.159*** (0.009) 0.030*** (0.011) 
    0.217*** (0.010) 0.092*** (0.014) 0.213
*** (0.01) 0.093*** (0.015)  0.163*** (0.007) 0.061*** (0.014) 0.161*** (0.007) 0.060*** (0.014) 
    0.261
*** (0.007) 0.216*** (0.016) 0.256*** (0.007) 0.219*** (0.017)  0.241*** (0.006) 0.088*** (0.018) 0.239*** (0.006) 0.088*** (0.018) 
    0.191*** (0.006) 0.173*** (0.012) 0.184
*** (0.006) 0.174*** (0.012)  0.154*** (0.005) 0.086*** (0.019) 0.15*** (0.006) 0.086*** (0.019) 
    0.260
*** (0.010) 0.117*** (0.011) 0.253*** (0.012) 0.117*** (0.010)  0.190*** (0.006) 0.049** (0.021) 0.187*** (0.007) 0.049** (0.021) 
    0.122
*** (0.017) 0.187*** (0.009) 0.114*** (0.016) 0.187*** (0.008)  0.131*** (0.010) 0.078*** (0.018) 0.13*** (0.01) 0.077*** (0.018) 
     0.065*** (0.010) 0.071*** (0.014) 0.057
*** (0.009) 0.070*** (0.014)  0.026*** (0.006) 0.036*** (0.010) 0.023*** (0.006) 0.035*** (0.010) 
     0.104
*** (0.005) 0.041*** (0.009) 0.100*** (0.006) 0.040*** (0.009)  0.068*** (0.004) 0.013 (0.010) 0.064*** (0.005) 0.013 (0.010) 
     0.081
*** (0.005) 0.050*** (0.007) 0.077*** (0.005) 0.052*** (0.008)  0.048*** (0.003) 0.040*** (0.012) 0.046*** (0.003) 0.039*** (0.012) 
     0.070
*** (0.005) 0.058*** (0.007) 0.067*** (0.005) 0.060*** (0.007)  0.028*** (0.004) 0.022*** (0.008) 0.027*** (0.004) 0.021*** (0.008) 
     0.098
*** (0.004) 0.064*** (0.009) 0.097*** (0.004) 0.063*** (0.009)  0.078*** (0.004) 0.056*** (0.009) 0.078*** (0.004) 0.056*** (0.009) 
     0.084*** (0.007)   0.082
*** (0.008)    0.074*** (0.004) 0.015 (0.013) 0.070*** (0.005) 0.015 (0.013) 
Table 4 (continued) 
    -0.058
*** (0.010) 0.049*** (0.013) -0.058*** (0.010) 0.047*** (0.013)  -0.037*** (0.006) 0.036** (0.015) -0.036*** (0.006) 0.036** (0.015) 
    -0.093
*** (0.008) -0.100*** (0.009) -0.092*** (0.009) -0.092*** (0.009)  -0.111*** (0.006) -0.089*** (0.010) -0.117*** (0.008) -0.089*** (0.010) 
    0.136
*** (0.021) -0.033** (0.013) 0.139*** (0.018) -0.026* (0.015)  0.069*** (0.010) -0.012 (0.015) 0.066*** (0.010) -0.012 (0.015) 
    0.220
*** (0.014) 0.064*** (0.019) 0.22*** (0.012) 0.072*** (0.019)  0.175*** (0.009) 0.021 (0.016) 0.172*** (0.009) 0.020 (0.016) 
    0.226*** (0.009) 0.142*** (0.014) 0.222
*** (0.008) 0.151*** (0.015)  0.179*** (0.007) 0.034*** (0.012) 0.175*** (0.007) 0.033*** (0.012) 
    0.298*** (0.007) 0.216*** (0.017) 0.291
*** (0.007) 0.22*** (0.018)  0.249*** (0.006) 0.092*** (0.019) 0.246*** (0.006) 0.092*** (0.019) 
    0.241
*** (0.005) 0.176*** (0.010) 0.232*** (0.006) 0.175*** (0.011)  0.202*** (0.005) 0.071*** (0.013) 0.199*** (0.006) 0.071*** (0.013) 
    0.196*** (0.005) 0.172*** (0.008) 0.187
*** (0.006) 0.173*** (0.008)  0.174*** (0.005) 0.106*** (0.010) 0.172*** (0.005) 0.106*** (0.010) 
    0.148
*** (0.008) 0.189*** (0.013) 0.14*** (0.007) 0.189*** (0.013)  0.136*** (0.005) 0.129*** (0.014) 0.135*** (0.006) 0.129*** (0.014) 
    0.121
*** (0.005) 0.074*** (0.007) 0.115*** (0.005) 0.076*** (0.008)  0.093*** (0.004) 0.070*** (0.010) 0.092*** (0.004) 0.070*** (0.010) 
     0.167
*** (0.009) 0.072*** (0.011) 0.163*** (0.01) 0.07*** (0.012)  0.139*** (0.006) 0.046*** (0.008) 0.137*** (0.006) 0.046*** (0.008) 
     0.113
*** (0.006) 0.128*** (0.011) 0.108*** (0.007) 0.126*** (0.011)  0.119*** (0.005) 0.083*** (0.012) 0.117*** (0.006) 0.082*** (0.012) 
     0.089
*** (0.008) 0.106*** (0.008) 0.082*** (0.007) 0.103*** (0.009)  0.087*** (0.004) 0.071*** (0.011) 0.085*** (0.004) 0.071*** (0.011) 
     0.081
*** (0.006) 0.026*** (0.008) 0.075*** (0.006) 0.025*** (0.008)  0.067*** (0.003) 0.041*** (0.008) 0.064*** (0.004) 0.040*** (0.008) 
     0.154*** (0.011) 0.063*** (0.008) 0.15
*** (0.011) 0.062*** (0.008)  0.113*** (0.006) 0.039*** (0.008) 0.112*** (0.006) 0.039*** (0.008) 
     0.001 (0.012)   -0.005 (0.011)    0.005 (0.007) 0.036*** (0.012) 0.004 (0.007) 0.035*** (0.012) 
  -0.062*** (0.003) -0.066*** (0.004) -0.096*** (0.016) -0.094*** (0.016)  -0.092*** (0.002) -0.061*** (0.003) -0.104*** (0.032) -0.060*** (0.003) 
   0.910*** (0.007) 0.951*** (0.011) 0.578*** (0.128) 0.583*** (0.129)  0.952*** (0.003) 1.002*** (0.013) 0.894*** (0.276) 1.002*** (0.014) 
   0.884*** (0.008) 0.940*** (0.012) 0.562*** (0.124) 0.577*** (0.127)  0.927*** (0.004) 0.996*** (0.016) 0.869*** (0.268) 0.995*** (0.015) 
  0.038*** (0.002) 0.040*** (0.003) 0.037*** (0.003) 0.035*** (0.005)  0.057*** (0.001) 0.034*** (0.001) 0.058*** (0.001) 0.034*** (0.002) 
                  
Obs.  
(N x T) 
60,002 
(38 x 1,579) 
47,370 
(30 x 1,579) 
60,002 
(38 x 1,579) 
47,370 
(30 x 1,579) 
 214,744 
(136 x 1,579) 
33,159 
(21 x 1579) 
214,744 
(136 x 1,579) 
33,159 
(21 x 1579) 
     646.02 376.78 571.25 101.27  2829.06 339.47 1020.82 339.34 
H0  
        
616.88 [0.000] 30.71 [0.000] 15.01 [0.000] 5.90 [0.015]  905.37 [0.000] 4.94 [0.026] 10.04 [0.002] 4.91 [0.027] 
Standard errors are in parenthesis and p-values are reported in brackets. The optimal lag length has been selected by minimizing the AIC. We denote ***, **, * to indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Regressions include step dummy variables to control for changes in the Spanish VAT rate on fuels (1st 
June 2010 and 1st September 2012), and the hydrocarbon special tax in Catalonia (1st April 2012). N and T refer to the cross-sectional and temporal observations of the panel 
data, respectively. 
Table 5. Estimation results from Eq. (2) for Repsol, Cepsa, BP, and other expensive and cheap brands 
Madrid 
 MG  MG-CCE 
 Repsol Cepsa BP Other brands,  
expensive 
Other brands,  
cheap 
 Repsol Cepsa BP Other brands,  
expensive 
Other brands,  
cheap 
   -0.279*** (0.004) -0.304*** (0.006) -0.292*** (0.012) -0.275*** (0.010) -0.224*** (0.013)  -0.270*** (0.005) -0.301*** (0.006) -0.283*** (0.012) -0.246*** (0.020) -0.224*** (0.013) 
   -0.193*** (0.004) -0.171*** (0.004) -0.173*** (0.008) -0.164*** (0.015) -0.122*** (0.009)  -0.186*** (0.004) -0.168*** (0.004) -0.168*** (0.008) -0.152*** (0.020) -0.121*** (0.009) 
   -0.187*** (0.003) -0.195
*** (0.004) -0.156*** (0.007) -0.191*** (0.012) -0.156*** (0.010)  -0.181*** (0.004) -0.192*** (0.005) -0.150*** (0.007) -0.180*** (0.010) -0.154*** (0.010) 
   -0.170*** (0.003) -0.178*** (0.004) -0.199*** (0.007) -0.175*** (0.012) -0.137*** (0.008)  -0.162*** (0.004) -0.175*** (0.004) -0.194*** (0.008) -0.167*** (0.007) -0.138*** (0.008) 
   -0.175*** (0.003) -0.168*** (0.004) -0.133*** (0.006) -0.136*** (0.014) -0.110*** (0.010)  -0.169*** (0.004) -0.166*** (0.004) -0.129*** (0.005) -0.127*** (0.016) -0.111*** (0.010) 
   -0.151*** (0.003) -0.131*** (0.004) -0.095*** (0.006) -0.137*** (0.010) -0.076*** (0.009)  -0.143*** (0.005) -0.130*** (0.004) -0.091*** (0.006) -0.126*** (0.013) -0.075*** (0.009) 
   0.136*** (0.003) 0.059*** (0.004) 0.101*** (0.009) 0.132*** (0.012) 0.098*** (0.011)  0.139*** (0.004) 0.059*** (0.004) 0.101*** (0.008) 0.128*** (0.010) 0.100*** (0.011) 
   -0.054*** (0.003) -0.021*** (0.003) -0.064*** (0.006) -0.043*** (0.010) -0.033*** (0.007)  -0.049*** (0.003) -0.02*** (0.003) -0.065*** (0.006) -0.044*** (0.009) -0.032*** (0.008) 
   -0.076*** (0.002) -0.089*** (0.003) -0.047*** (0.004) -0.080*** (0.013) -0.041*** (0.006)  -0.073*** (0.002) -0.088*** (0.003) -0.047*** (0.004) -0.084*** (0.014) -0.041*** (0.006) 
    -0.119*** (0.002) -0.092*** (0.003) -0.047*** (0.005) -0.068*** (0.012) -0.047*** (0.006)  -0.114*** (0.003) -0.091*** (0.003) -0.048*** (0.005) -0.069*** (0.012) -0.048*** (0.006) 
    -0.067*** (0.002) -0.067*** (0.003) -0.065*** (0.004) -0.026*** (0.006) -0.037*** (0.005)  -0.065*** (0.002) -0.067*** (0.003) -0.065*** (0.004) -0.028*** (0.005) -0.037*** (0.005) 
    -0.066*** (0.001) -0.083*** (0.002) -0.050*** (0.005) -0.034 (0.022) -0.033*** (0.007)  -0.066*** (0.002) -0.082*** (0.002) -0.049*** (0.005) -0.033 (0.021) -0.033*** (0.007) 
    -0.052*** (0.002) -0.008*** (0.002) -0.002 (0.007) -0.046*** (0.013) -0.019*** (0.005)  -0.053*** (0.003) -0.008*** (0.002) -0.002 (0.007) -0.044*** (0.012) -0.019*** (0.005) 
    0.156*** (0.002) 0.107*** (0.002) 0.090*** (0.006) 0.107*** (0.023) 0.115*** (0.010)  0.151*** (0.004) 0.106*** (0.002) 0.088*** (0.006) 0.102*** (0.021) 0.115*** (0.010) 
    0.041*** (0.002) 0.023
*** (0.002) 0.036*** (0.007) 0.018 (0.021) 0.014** (0.006)  0.039*** (0.002) 0.023*** (0.002) 0.033*** (0.007) 0.017 (0.020) 0.013** (0.005) 
    0.041*** (0.003) 0.030
*** (0.004) 0.061*** (0.013) 0.012 (0.011) -0.026 (0.016)  0.039*** (0.004) 0.030*** (0.004) 0.060*** (0.013) 0.009 (0.011) -0.026 (0.016) 
    -0.012
*** (0.003) 0.100*** (0.005) -0.027*** (0.009) -0.022 (0.022) -0.046*** (0.013)  -0.020** (0.008) 0.100*** (0.005) -0.010 (0.012) 0.010 (0.019) -0.046*** (0.014) 
    0.319
** (0.010) 0.273*** (0.006) 0.200*** (0.019) 0.080 (0.058) 0.062*** (0.021)  0.310*** (0.012) 0.273*** (0.006) 0.216*** (0.014) 0.107* (0.059) 0.055*** (0.021) 
    0.122*** (0.006) 0.125*** (0.005) 0.140*** (0.010) 0.079 (0.063) 0.179*** (0.021)  0.106*** (0.008) 0.124*** (0.005) 0.147*** (0.011) 0.102* (0.054) 0.182*** (0.022) 
    0.229
*** (0.005) 0.220*** (0.005) 0.137*** (0.008) 0.128*** (0.041) 0.048*** (0.011)  0.222*** (0.006) 0.219*** (0.005) 0.143*** (0.009) 0.124*** (0.037) 0.047*** (0.011) 
    0.225
*** (0.004) 0.240*** (0.005) 0.203*** (0.012) 0.112*** (0.039) 0.068*** (0.012)  0.216*** (0.007) 0.239*** (0.006) 0.208*** (0.011) 0.117*** (0.037) 0.065*** (0.012) 
    0.258*** (0.004) 0.243*** (0.005) 0.250*** (0.009) 0.250*** (0.021) 0.205*** (0.019)  0.251*** (0.005) 0.242*** (0.005) 0.25*** (0.01) 0.255*** (0.02) 0.209*** (0.020) 
    0.185
*** (0.004) 0.161*** (0.005) 0.175*** (0.009) 0.188*** (0.032) 0.183*** (0.014)  0.177*** (0.004) 0.159*** (0.005) 0.173*** (0.009) 0.179*** (0.029) 0.185*** (0.014) 
    0.275*** (0.005) 0.197*** (0.004) 0.200*** (0.011) 0.207*** (0.031) 0.117*** (0.012)  0.267*** (0.006) 0.196*** (0.004) 0.198*** (0.011) 0.196*** (0.030) 0.118*** (0.012) 
    0.068*** (0.008) 0.211
*** (0.004) 0.196*** (0.010) 0.239*** (0.019) 0.190*** (0.010)  0.058*** (0.007) 0.208*** (0.004) 0.192*** (0.009) 0.23*** (0.021) 0.191*** (0.010) 
     0.033*** (0.003) 0.037
*** (0.005) 0.041*** (0.015) 0.183*** (0.027) 0.091*** (0.016)  0.027*** (0.004) 0.035*** (0.004) 0.035*** (0.013) 0.164*** (0.021) 0.092*** (0.015) 
     0.097
*** (0.003) 0.097*** (0.003) 0.048*** (0.008) 0.078*** (0.027) 0.051*** (0.011)  0.091*** (0.006) 0.095*** (0.004) 0.047*** (0.008) 0.065*** (0.023) 0.051*** (0.010) 
     0.069
*** (0.003) 0.057*** (0.004) 0.061*** (0.006) 0.100*** (0.021) 0.065*** (0.009)  0.062*** (0.005) 0.055*** (0.004) 0.060*** (0.005) 0.096*** (0.022) 0.068*** (0.009) 
     0.069*** (0.002) 0.018
*** (0.004) 0.032*** (0.010) 0.058*** (0.016) 0.074*** (0.007)  0.060*** (0.007) 0.017*** (0.004) 0.031*** (0.009) 0.056*** (0.014) 0.077*** (0.007) 
     0.101
*** (0.003) 0.093*** (0.004) 0.073*** (0.008) 0.087*** (0.015) 0.061*** (0.011)  0.094*** (0.006) 0.092*** (0.004) 0.074*** (0.007) 0.083*** (0.012) 0.060*** (0.011) 
          0.078
*** (0.003) 0.125*** (0.004) 0.033*** (0.011) 0.033** (0.015) 0.013*** (0.011)  0.071*** (0.005) 0.124*** (0.004) 0.032*** (0.011) 0.028 (0.018) 0.013 (0.012) 
Table 5 (continued) 
    -0.082*** (0.004) -0.032
*** (0.003) -0.088*** (0.019) 0.046** (0.019) 0.066*** (0.011)  -0.077*** (0.007) -0.032*** (0.003) -0.090*** (0.019) 0.049*** (0.018) 0.065*** (0.011) 
    -0.127
*** (0.003) -0.026*** (0.003) -0.064*** (0.011) -0.120*** (0.027) -0.106*** (0.009)  -0.132*** (0.006) -0.024*** (0.003) -0.043*** (0.008) -0.097*** (0.032) -0.108*** (0.010) 
    0.164
*** (0.009) 0.113*** (0.006) -0.012** (0.006) -0.130*** (0.029) -0.061*** (0.009)  0.163*** (0.008) 0.114*** (0.005) 0.007 (0.010) -0.099*** (0.026) -0.064*** (0.010) 
    0.216
*** (0.004) 0.257*** (0.007) 0.174*** (0.016) 0.033 (0.044) 0.039** (0.016)  0.207*** (0.007) 0.259*** (0.006) 0.190*** (0.012) 0.061 (0.044) 0.039** (0.016) 
    0.218
*** (0.004) 0.254*** (0.004) 0.221*** (0.010) 0.100*** (0.011) 0.129*** (0.014)  0.207*** (0.007) 0.254*** (0.004) 0.230*** (0.008) 0.120*** (0.010) 0.133*** (0.017) 
    0.302
*** (0.004) 0.257*** (0.005) 0.258*** (0.009) 0.229*** (0.024) 0.199*** (0.021)  0.288*** (0.009) 0.256*** (0.005) 0.260*** (0.010) 0.236*** (0.025) 0.202*** (0.021) 
    0.246*** (0.004) 0.216
*** (0.005) 0.265*** (0.009) 0.244*** (0.023) 0.174*** (0.011)  0.229*** (0.009) 0.214*** (0.005) 0.265*** (0.009) 0.233*** (0.026) 0.171*** (0.011) 
    0.188
*** (0.003) 0.196*** (0.005) 0.198*** (0.008) 0.234*** (0.016) 0.177*** (0.010)  0.174*** (0.006) 0.193*** (0.005) 0.194*** (0.008) 0.223*** (0.016) 0.177*** (0.010) 
    0.143*** (0.005) 0.148
*** (0.004) 0.154*** (0.011) 0.208*** (0.025) 0.196*** (0.014)  0.133*** (0.006) 0.145*** (0.004) 0.152*** (0.010) 0.192*** (0.019) 0.196*** (0.014) 
    0.119
*** (0.003) 0.104*** (0.003) 0.090*** (0.008) 0.150*** (0.031) 0.085*** (0.008)  0.116*** (0.004) 0.102*** (0.003) 0.087*** (0.008) 0.128*** (0.023) 0.088*** (0.008) 
     0.186*** (0.004) 0.160
*** (0.005) 0.149*** (0.012) 0.096** (0.042) 0.062*** (0.011)  0.18*** (0.005) 0.159*** (0.005) 0.149*** (0.012) 0.083** (0.042) 0.060*** (0.012) 
     0.114
*** (0.005) 0.109*** (0.004) 0.106*** (0.009) 0.147*** (0.031) 0.142*** (0.011)  0.108*** (0.004) 0.107*** (0.004) 0.103*** (0.009) 0.141*** (0.036) 0.142*** (0.011) 
     0.078
*** (0.003) 0.078*** (0.003) 0.120*** (0.006) 0.179*** (0.025) 0.126*** (0.010)  0.074*** (0.003) 0.076*** (0.003) 0.116*** (0.006) 0.163*** (0.015) 0.123*** (0.011) 
     0.070
*** (0.003) 0.112*** (0.003) 0.088*** (0.008) 0.071*** (0.017) 0.023*** (0.007)  0.068*** (0.004) 0.111*** (0.003) 0.083*** (0.008) 0.057*** (0.014) 0.023*** (0.007) 
     0.169
*** (0.004) 0.095*** (0.003) 0.108*** (0.006) 0.053*** (0.014) 0.060*** (0.010)  0.168*** (0.005) 0.094*** (0.003) 0.104*** (0.007) 0.046*** (0.017) 0.061*** (0.010) 
     -0.022
*** (0.005) -0.032*** (0.005) 0.028*** (0.009) 0.153*** (0.007) 0.108*** (0.012)  -0.024*** (0.004) -0.034*** (0.005) 0.024*** (0.008) 0.146*** (0.009) 0.107*** (0.011) 
  -0.068*** (0.002) -0.059*** (0.002) -0.071*** (0.003) -0.058*** (0.008) -0.064*** (0.005)  -0.082*** (0.008) -0.077*** (0.008) -0.103*** (0.016) -0.188*** (0.046) -0.09*** (0.019) 
   0.922*** (0.004) 0.915*** (0.004) 0.947*** (0.011) 0.990***  (0.026) 0.963*** (0.012)  0.852*** (0.108) 0.684*** (0.080) 0.466*** (0.138) 0.145*** (0.119) 0.683*** (0.145) 
   0.898*** (0.004) 0.892*** (0.005) 0.931*** (0.012) 0.974*** (0.029) 0.954*** (0.013)  0.843*** (0.113) 0.667*** (0.078) 0.458*** (0.135) 0.143*** (0.118) 0.677*** (0.143) 
   0.041*** (0.001) 0.036*** (0.001) 0.044*** (0.002) 0.036*** (0.005) 0.039*** (0.003)  0.045*** (0.003) 0.035*** (0.001) 0.031*** (0.006) 0.015*** (0.011) 0.038*** (0.003) 
                      
Obs.  
(N x T) 
233,692 
(148 x 1,579) 
108,951 
(69 x 1,579) 
39,475 
(25 x 1,579) 
7,895 
(5 x 1,579) 
36,317 
(23 x 1,579) 
 233,692 
 (148 x 1,579) 
108,951 
(69 x 1,579) 
39,475 
(25 x 1,579) 
7,895 
(5 x 1,579) 
36,317 
(23 x 1,579) 
     3025.31 1622.60 853.55 74.74 265.16  1069.23 819.80 140.54 439.07 156.47 
H0  
       
1215.62 [0.000] 974.07 [0.000] 78.64 [0.000] 32.04 [0.000] 13.46 [0.000]  0.67 [0.414] 52.09 [0.000] 6.06 [0.014] 0.72 [0.397] 6.81 [0.009] 
  
Table 5 (continued) 
Catalonia 
 MG  MG-CCE 
 Repsol Cepsa BP Other brands,  
expensive 
Other brands,  
cheap 
 Repsol Cepsa BP Other brands,  
expensive 
Other brands,  
cheap 
   -0.244*** (0.004) -0.276*** (0.005) -0.148*** (0.022) -0.079*** (0.008) -0.033*** (0.011)  -0.239*** (0.005) -0.270*** (0.006) -0.147*** (0.021) -0.077*** (0.008) -0.034*** (0.011) 
   -0.148*** (0.004) -0.150*** (0.004) -0.029* (0.017) 0.011** (0.005) 0.033*** (0.010)  -0.143*** (0.005) -0.145*** (0.004) -0.028* (0.016) 0.012** (0.005) 0.034*** (0.010) 
   -0.147*** (0.004) -0.170*** (0.003) -0.042*** (0.010) -0.024*** (0.007) -0.002 (0.008)  -0.145*** (0.004) -0.166*** (0.004) -0.042*** (0.010) -0.024*** (0.007) -0.002 (0.008) 
   -0.128*** (0.003) -0.155*** (0.004) -0.038** (0.016) -0.010* (0.005) -0.004 (0.012)  -0.126*** (0.004) -0.152*** (0.004) -0.037** (0.016) -0.010* (0.005) -0.004 (0.012) 
   -0.139*** (0.003) -0.160*** (0.004) -0.032*** (0.008) -0.008* (0.004) 0.004 (0.005)  -0.136*** (0.004) -0.157*** (0.005) -0.032*** (0.008) -0.008* (0.004) 0.004 (0.005) 
   -0.113*** (0.003) -0.122*** (0.003) 0.005 (0.007) -0.011*** (0.003) 0.014*** (0.004)  -0.111*** (0.003) -0.12*** (0.004) 0.005 (0.007) -0.010*** (0.003) 0.015*** (0.004) 
   0.160*** (0.004) 0.081*** (0.003) 0.192*** (0.025) 0.169*** (0.014) 0.06*** (0.012)  0.159*** (0.004) 0.082*** (0.003) 0.193*** (0.026) 0.169*** (0.014) 0.060*** (0.012) 
   -0.032*** (0.003) -0.012*** (0.003) 0.026*** (0.009) 0.027*** (0.005) 0.017*** (0.005)  -0.030*** (0.003) -0.011*** (0.002) 0.027*** (0.009) 0.027*** (0.005) 0.018*** (0.005) 
   -0.059*** (0.003) -0.079*** (0.002) -0.002 (0.013) -0.007*** (0.002) 0.013*** (0.004)  -0.056*** (0.003) -0.078*** (0.003) -0.001 (0.013) -0.007*** (0.002) 0.013*** (0.004) 
    -0.106*** (0.003) -0.076*** (0.003) -0.005 (0.006) -0.022*** (0.005) 0.009* (0.006)  -0.103*** (0.003) -0.075*** (0.004) -0.004 (0.006) -0.022*** (0.005) 0.009* (0.006) 
    -0.057*** (0.003) -0.060*** (0.003) -0.029*** (0.006) -0.025*** (0.004) 0.008 (0.006)  -0.057*** (0.003) -0.059*** (0.003) -0.029*** (0.006) -0.024*** (0.004) 0.009 (0.006) 
    -0.057*** (0.002) -0.072*** (0.002) 0.001 (0.005) -0.015*** (0.004) 0.012** (0.006)  -0.056*** (0.002) -0.071*** (0.002) 0.001 (0.004) -0.015*** (0.004) 0.012** (0.006) 
    -0.057*** (0.002) -0.007*** (0.002) -0.033 (0.022) -0.014*** (0.005) 0.003 (0.003)  -0.056*** (0.002) -0.007*** (0.002) -0.033 (0.022) -0.014*** (0.005) 0.003 (0.003) 
    0.153*** (0.002) 0.098*** (0.002) 0.106*** (0.021) 0.115*** (0.010) 0.034*** (0.011)  0.151*** (0.003) 0.097*** (0.002) 0.107*** (0.021) 0.115*** (0.01) 0.034*** (0.011) 
    0.038*** (0.002) 0.031*** (0.002) 0.032*** (0.011) 0.035*** (0.004) 0.003 (0.004)  0.038*** (0.002) 0.031*** (0.002) 0.032*** (0.011) 0.035*** (0.004) 0.003 (0.004) 
        -0.002 (0.011) -0.003 (0.004) -0.003 (0.002)      -0.002 (0.011) -0.003 (0.004) -0.003 (0.002) 
        -0.025** (0.012) 0.001 (0.004) 0.001 (0.005)      -0.025** (0.011) -0.001 (0.004) 0.001 (0.005) 
        -0.017*** (0.005)   0.001 (0.006)      -0.017*** (0.005)   0.001 (0.006) 
    0.054*** (0.003) 0.061*** (0.003) -0.011 (0.029) 0.017* (0.009) -0.010** (0.005)  0.054*** (0.003) 0.062*** (0.003) -0.010 (0.029) 0.017* (0.009) -0.009** (0.005) 
    -0.019
*** (0.003) 0.062*** (0.005) -0.042 (0.026) -0.129*** (0.010) -0.056*** (0.011)  -0.026*** (0.004) 0.060*** (0.005) -0.045* (0.025) -0.13*** (0.009) -0.056*** (0.011) 
    0.337
*** (0.007) 0.254*** (0.007) -0.001 (0.061) -0.063*** (0.017) -0.009 (0.011)  0.330*** (0.008) 0.251*** (0.007) 0.001 (0.062) -0.064*** (0.017) -0.010 (0.011) 
    0.080*** (0.005) 0.093*** (0.005) 0.127*** (0.025) 0.054*** (0.015) 0.013 (0.018)  0.072*** (0.005) 0.090*** (0.004) 0.127*** (0.025) 0.052*** (0.015) 0.013 (0.018) 
    0.210
*** (0.004) 0.199*** (0.005) -0.012 (0.033) -0.076*** (0.012) -0.03*** (0.009)  0.203*** (0.006) 0.196*** (0.005) -0.012 (0.033) -0.078*** (0.012) -0.030*** (0.009) 
    0.196
*** (0.005) 0.202*** (0.004) 0.015 (0.058) -0.022** (0.010) 0.008 (0.013)  0.193*** (0.005) 0.198*** (0.005) 0.016 (0.058) -0.023** (0.010) 0.007 (0.013) 
    0.238*** (0.004) 0.215*** (0.004) 0.188*** (0.015)   0.051*** (0.017)  0.236*** (0.005) 0.212*** (0.005) 0.190*** (0.016)   0.051*** (0.017) 
    0.137
*** (0.004) 0.145*** (0.004)        0.132*** (0.005) 0.141*** (0.004)       
    0.246*** (0.004) 0.167*** (0.005)        0.241*** (0.005) 0.165*** (0.006)       
    0.009*** (0.005) 0.176*** (0.005)        0.007 (0.005) 0.172*** (0.006)       
     -0.008*** (0.004) 0.002*** (0.004)        -0.011*** (0.004) -0.001 (0.003)       
     0.073
*** (0.003) 0.075*** (0.003)        0.070*** (0.005) 0.073*** (0.003)       
     0.042
*** (0.003) 0.026*** (0.003)        0.039*** (0.003) 0.024*** (0.003)       
Table 5 (continued) 
     0.052*** (0.003) 0.001*** (0.003)        0.050*** (0.004) -0.002 (0.003)       
     0.087
*** (0.004) 0.064*** (0.004)        0.087*** (0.004) 0.063*** (0.004)       
     0.078
*** (0.003) 0.112*** (0.003)        0.075*** (0.004) 0.111*** (0.003)       
    -0.105*** (0.004) -0.033*** (0.003) 0.076 (0.058) 0.036*** (0.010) 0.042*** (0.013)  -0.104*** (0.004) -0.033*** (0.003) 0.070 (0.056) 0.036*** (0.010) 0.042*** (0.013) 
    -0.145
*** (0.004) -0.035*** (0.004) -0.200*** (0.030) -0.200*** (0.010) -0.110*** (0.011)  -0.155*** (0.006) -0.035*** (0.004) -0.200*** (0.030) -0.201*** (0.010) -0.111*** (0.011) 
    0.191
*** (0.005) 0.077*** (0.005) -0.126*** (0.036) -0.173*** (0.014) -0.050*** (0.014)  0.184*** (0.005) 0.075*** (0.005) -0.124*** (0.037) -0.175*** (0.014) -0.050*** (0.013) 
    0.213
*** (0.004) 0.234*** (0.007) 0.025 (0.072) -0.043** (0.018) -0.027* (0.014)  0.207*** (0.004) 0.232*** (0.007) 0.028 (0.073) -0.044** (0.017) -0.028** (0.014) 
    0.208
*** (0.003) 0.216*** (0.006) 0.141*** (0.034) 0.009 (0.014) -0.004 (0.011)  0.202*** (0.004) 0.213*** (0.006) 0.139*** (0.035) 0.008 (0.013) -0.004 (0.011) 
    0.274
*** (0.005) 0.229*** (0.006) 0.161*** (0.022) 0.126*** (0.011) 0.049*** (0.017)  0.269*** (0.006) 0.226*** (0.007) 0.160*** (0.022) 0.124*** (0.011) 0.049*** (0.017) 
    0.210*** (0.004) 0.196*** (0.006) 0.108*** (0.023)   0.026** (0.013)  0.205*** (0.005) 0.192*** (0.006) 0.108*** (0.023)   0.026** (0.013) 
    0.149
*** (0.004) 0.160*** (0.005)        0.144*** (0.005) 0.157*** (0.006)       
    0.091*** (0.004) 0.130*** (0.004)        0.089*** (0.004) 0.127*** (0.004)       
    0.091*** (0.004) 0.095*** (0.003)        0.088*** (0.004) 0.093*** (0.004)       
     0.169*** (0.004) 0.159*** (0.003)        0.166*** (0.004) 0.157*** (0.004)       
     0.068
*** (0.003) 0.106*** (0.003)        0.063*** (0.004) 0.103*** (0.003)       
     0.049
*** (0.003) 0.079*** (0.004)        0.045*** (0.004) 0.076*** (0.004)       
     0.040
*** (0.003) 0.090*** (0.003)        0.037*** (0.004) 0.089*** (0.003)       
     0.164
*** (0.004) 0.104*** (0.003)        0.162*** (0.004) 0.103*** (0.003)       
     -0.047
*** (0.004) -0.046*** (0.004)        -0.047*** (0.004) -0.047*** (0.004)       
  -0.075*** (0.002) -0.089*** (0.003) -0.123*** (0.010) -0.182*** (0.006) -0.095*** (0.006)  -0.085*** (0.011) -0.106** (0.053) -0.125*** (0.010) -0.208*** (0.016) -0.094*** (0.006) 
   0.953*** (0.005) 0.955*** (0.004) 1.001*** (0.012) 0.986*** (0.005) 1.011*** (0.014)  0.944***  (0.123) 0.807*** (0.400) 0.989*** (0.025) 0.871*** (0.061) 1.015*** (0.017) 
   0.929** (0.005) 0.931*** (0.005) 0.992*** (0.018) 0.967*** (0.006) 1.004*** (0.016)  0.919*** (0.120) 0.786*** (0.390) 0.975*** (0.029) 0.854*** (0.060) 1.008*** (0.020) 
  0.045*** (0.001) 0.054*** (0.002) 0.076*** (0.005) 0.113*** (0.004) 0.053*** (0.004)  0.049*** (0.002) 0.055*** (0.002) 0.076*** (0.006) 0.114*** (0.004) 0.053*** (0.004) 
                      
Obs.  
(N x T) 
208,428 
(132 x 1579) 
132,636 
(84 x 1579) 
7,895 
(5 x 1,579) 
64,739 
(41 x 1,579) 
31,580 
(20 x 1,579) 
 208,428 
(132 x 1579) 
132,636 
(84 x 1579) 
7,895 
(5 x 1,579) 
64,739 
(41 x 1,579) 
31,580 
(20 x 1,579) 
     1243.47 902.49 324.41 944.04 265.23  631.35 921.04 367.89 1258.63 260.74 
H0  
      
506.27 [0.000] 471.16 [0.000] 4.34 [0.064] 174.75 [0.000] 5.54 [0.019]  4.39 [0.036] 107.11 [0.000] 4.93 [0.027] 4.39 [0.036] 4.93 [0.027] 
Standard errors are in parenthesis and p-values in brackets. The optimal lag length has been selected by minimizing the Akaike Information Criteria. We denote ***, **, * to 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Regressions include step dummy variables to control for changes in the Spanish VAT rate on fuels (1st 
June 2010 and 1st September 2012) and the hydrocarbon special tax in Catalonia (1st April 2012). N and T refer, respectively, to the cross-sectional and temporal observations of 





Table A1. Tax rates on diesel fuel 
 In force from 
Value added tax  
  
 16% 1st January 2006 
 18% 1st July 2010 
 21% 1st September 2012 
   
Special hydrocarbon taxes (€/liter)  
  
 General section:  
 0.307 13th June 2009 
   
State section:  
 0.024 1st January 2002 
   
Regional section:  
 0.017 (Madrid) 1st January 2002 
 0.024 (Catalonia) 1st January 2002  
 0.048 (Catalonia) 1st April 2012 
Author׳s own elaboration from information from the Spanish Ministry of 






Table C1. Unit root tests on the alternative measures of retail price dispersion 
 Breitung-Das  Phillips-Perron  Augmented Dickey-
Fuller 
Model with constant   
Citywide dispersion in Madrid -45.397***       
Citywide dispersion in Catalonia -34.401***       
  it wide dispersion in Madrid -130.000***       
  it wide dispersion in Catalonia -100.000***       
        
ZIP-code dispersion in Madrid -55.061***       
ZIP-code dispersion in Catalonia -33.769***       
    -code dispersion in Madrid -140.000***       
    -code dispersion in Catalonia -110.000***       
        
Regional standard deviation in Madrid   -3.710*** (7)  -2.886** (7) 
Regional standard deviation in Catalonia   -2.655* (7)  -2.835* (17) 
  egional standard deviation in Madrid   -51.056*** (7)  -11.976*** (14) 
  egional standard deviation  in Catalonia   -36.758*** (7)  -10.667*** (21) 
 
Model with constant and trend 
Citywide dispersion in Madrid -64.655***       
Citywide dispersion in Catalonia -46.151***       
  it wide dispersion in Madrid -160.000***       
  it wide dispersion in Catalonia -120.000***       
        
ZIP-code dispersion in Madrid -74.630***       
ZIP-code dispersion in Catalonia -46.568***       
    -code dispersion in Madrid -170.000***       
    -code dispersion in Catalonia -130.000***       
        
Regional standard deviation in Madrid   -7.926*** (7)  -5.673*** (7) 
Regional standard deviation in Catalonia   -6.552*** (7)  -5.692*** (10) 
  egional standard deviation in Madrid   -51.039*** (7)  -13.209*** (6) 
  egional standard deviation  in Catalonia   -36.747*** (7)  -11.851*** (13) 
We denote ***, **, * to indicate the rejection of the null hypothesis of non-stationarity at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels of significance, respectively. The optimal lag length (in parenthesis) is based on the Newey-West 
Criterion for the Phillips-Perron test, and the Schwarz Information Criterion for the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller test. The critical values are obtained from MacKinnon (1991).  
 
Table D1. Robustness check for Eq. (1) 
 Madrid  Catalonia 












   0.484*** (0.008) 0.474*** (0.009) 0.758*** (0.025)  0.575*** (0.011) 0.581*** (0.01) 0.948*** (0.025) 
   0.083*** (0.004) 0.075*** (0.006) 0.059* (0.031)  0.057*** (0.004) 0.059*** (0.004) 0.001 (0.034) 
   0.011*** (0.002) 0.016*** (0.005) -0.005 (0.031)  -0.013** (0.005) -0.018*** (0.006) -0.082** (0.034) 
   0.027*** (0.003) 0.018*** (0.004) 0.053* (0.031)  0.018*** (0.006) 0.021*** (0.006) -0.011 (0.034) 
   0.008*** (0.002) 0.016*** (0.004) 0.003 (0.031)  0.013*** (0.004) 0.015*** (0.004) 0.075** (0.034) 
   0.014*** (0.003) 0.007* (0.004) 0.060* (0.031)  -0.001 (0.004) 0.003 (0.004) 0.035 (0.033) 
   0.122*** (0.005) 0.106*** (0.005) 0.146*** (0.031)  0.107*** (0.006) 0.098*** (0.006) 0.193*** (0.033) 
   -0.051*** (0.004) -0.043*** (0.004) -0.107*** (0.024)  -0.058*** (0.004) -0.049*** (0.004) -0.198*** (0.023) 
   -0.012*** (0.002) -0.003 (0.003)    -0.007** (0.004) -0.011*** (0.004)   
    -0.003 (0.002) -0.005** (0.003)    -0.007** (0.003) -0.005 (0.003)   
    0.008*** (0.002) 0.010*** (0.003)    0.011*** (0.002) 0.014*** (0.002)   
    0.001 (0.002) -0.001 (0.003)    -0.008*** (0.002) -0.007*** (0.003)   
    0.003 (0.002) 0.005* (0.003)    0.001 (0.003) 0.004 (0.003)   
    0.086*** (0.004) 0.069*** (0.004)    0.045*** (0.003) 0.041*** (0.003)   
    -0.032*** (0.003) -0.023*** (0.003)          
    0.007
*** (0.002) 0.006*** (0.002) 0.019** (0.008)  0.015*** (0.002) 0.013*** (0.002) 0.022*** (0.007) 
    -0.001 (0.002) -0.001 (0.002) -0.011 (0.008)  0.001 (0.002) -0.001 (0.002) 0.005 (0.007) 
    0.038
*** (0.004) 0.035*** (0.004) 0.071*** (0.008)  0.044*** (0.004) 0.039*** (0.004) 0.060*** (0.007) 
    -0.01
*** (0.003) -0.006* (0.003) -0.016* (0.009)  0.009*** (0.002) 0.009*** (0.002) 0.001 (0.007) 
    0.012*** (0.003) 0.011*** (0.003) 0.020** (0.008)  0.019*** (0.002) 0.017*** (0.002) 0.014** (0.007) 
    0.015*** (0.003) 0.015*** (0.002) 0.036*** (0.008)  0.018*** (0.003) 0.016*** (0.002) 0.017** (0.007) 
    0.004
** (0.002) 0.007*** (0.002) 0.018** (0.009)  0.016*** (0.002) 0.014*** (0.002) 0.033*** (0.007) 
    -0.002 (0.002) -0.002 (0.002)    0.004* (0.002) 0.005*** (0.002)   
    0.005
** (0.002) 0.002 (0.002)    0.006*** (0.002) 0.003 (0.002)   
    -0.011
*** (0.002) -0.010*** (0.002)    -0.007*** (0.002) -0.005*** (0.002)   
     -0.004
* (0.003) -0.002 (0.002)    -0.003* (0.002) -0.002 (0.002)   
     0.002 (0.002) 0.002 (0.001)    0.003
** (0.002) 0.002 (0.002)   
     0.001 (0.003) 0.001 (0.003)    -0.008*** (0.002) -0.008*** (0.001)   
     0.005
*** (0.002) 0.008*** (0.002)    0.004*** (0.002) 0.004*** (0.001)   
     0.003
* (0.002) 0.003* (0.001)          
    -0.01*** (0.002) -0.008*** (0.002) -0.017** (0.008)  -0.015*** (0.002) -0.012*** (0.002) -0.015** (0.006) 
    0.002 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 0.007 (0.008)  0.002 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) -0.008 (0.007) 
    0.005 (0.003) -0.001 (0.003) -0.003 (0.008)  -0.004
* (0.002) -0.007*** (0.002) 0.006 (0.006) 
    0.008
** (0.003) 0.003 (0.003) 0.017** (0.008)  0.005* (0.003) 0.003 (0.003) 0.029*** (0.006) 
    0.004 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) 0.010 (0.008)  0.008*** (0.002) 0.005** (0.002) 0.029*** (0.006) 
    0.009*** (0.002) 0.005*** (0.002) 0.020** (0.008)  0.013*** (0.002) 0.012*** (0.002) 0.032*** (0.007) 
    -0.002 (0.002) -0.002 (0.002) -0.001 (0.008)  0.003 (0.002) 0.003 (0.002) 0.010 (0.007) 
    0.003* (0.002) 0.004*** (0.002)    0.009*** (0.002) 0.009*** (0.001)   
    -0.003 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002)    0.005
** (0.002) 0.006*** (0.002)   
    0.006
*** (0.002) 0.007*** (0.001)    0.010*** (0.002) 0.010*** (0.002)   
     0.006
*** (0.002) 0.003 (0.002)    0.005** (0.002) 0.002 (0.002)   
     -0.005
*** (0.002) -0.003** (0.002)    -0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.002)   
     -0.002 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002)    0.008
*** (0.002) 0.009*** (0.002)   
     -0.007
*** (0.002) -0.007*** (0.002)    -0.006*** (0.001) -0.006*** (0.001)   
     -0.002 (0.001) -0.002
** (0.001)          
  0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000)  0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.001*** (0.000) 
Obs.  







(366 x 1,579) 
577,914 
(366 x 1,579) 
1,579 
Standard errors are in parenthesis. The optimal lag length has been selected by minimizing the AIC. We denote ***, **, * to 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Regressions include step dummy variables to 
control for changes in the Spanish VAT rate on fuels (1st June 2010 and 1st September 2012), and the hydrocarbon special tax 
in Catalonia (1st April 2012). N and T refer, respectively, to the cross-sectional and temporal observations of the panel data. 
 
Table E1. Panel unit root test on retail prices 
 Breitung-Das 
Model with constant  
     in Madrid -1.258 
     in Catalonia -1.232 
      in Madrid -64.893*** 
      in Catalonia -20.330*** 
  
Model with constant and trend 
    in Madrid -1.076 
    in Catalonia -1.272 
     in Madrid -77.416
*** 
     in Catalonia -67.936
*** 
We denote ***, **, * to indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively.
 
Table G1. Robustness check for the MG-CCE estimates from Eq. (2) with asymmetric speed 
Madrid 
 Expensive Cheap  Repsol Cepsa BP Other brands,  expensive 
Other brands,  
cheap 
   -0.235
*** (0.009) -0.165*** (0.014)  -0.230*** (0.004) -0.290*** (0.006) -0.270*** (0.014) -0.239*** (0.015) -0.193*** (0.013) 
   -0.111
*** (0.007) -0.030*** (0.007)  -0.124*** (0.003) -0.158*** (0.004) -0.144*** (0.009) -0.140*** (0.015) -0.085*** (0.009) 
   -0.106
*** (0.005) -0.050*** (0.006)  -0.113*** (0.003) -0.167*** (0.004) -0.112*** (0.007) -0.159*** (0.011) -0.106*** (0.009) 
   -0.081
*** (0.004) -0.036*** (0.005)  -0.076*** (0.002) -0.141*** (0.003) -0.144*** (0.009) -0.141*** (0.008) -0.082*** (0.007) 
   -0.078
*** (0.006) -0.020*** (0.005)  -0.085*** (0.003) -0.131*** (0.004) -0.071*** (0.005) -0.100*** (0.014) -0.050*** (0.008) 
   -0.037
*** (0.004) 0.002 (0.005)  -0.039*** (0.002) -0.078*** (0.003) -0.028*** (0.004) -0.092*** (0.013) -0.011* (0.007) 
   0.225
*** (0.005) 0.170*** (0.009)  0.230*** (0.003) 0.110*** (0.003) 0.159*** (0.007) 0.154*** (0.007) 0.151*** (0.011) 
   0.029
*** (0.004) 0.015** (0.007)  0.021*** (0.002) 0.035*** (0.002) -0.005 (0.005) -0.007 (0.007) 0.018*** (0.006) 
   -0.014
*** (0.004) -0.017*** (0.005)  -0.003 (0.002) -0.026*** (0.002) -0.001 (0.005) -0.051*** (0.014) -0.004 (0.006) 
    -0.063
*** (0.005) -0.029*** (0.005)  -0.077*** (0.003) -0.032*** (0.002) -0.003 (0.004) -0.041*** (0.013) -0.023*** (0.005) 
    -0.03
*** (0.003) -0.024*** (0.004)  -0.028*** (0.002) -0.022*** (0.003) -0.036*** (0.004) -0.002 (0.002) -0.015*** (0.004) 
    -0.046
*** (0.004) -0.035*** (0.006)  -0.035*** (0.002) -0.057*** (0.002) -0.028*** (0.005) -0.014 (0.021) -0.02*** (0.006) 
    -0.041
*** (0.004) -0.014*** (0.005)  -0.048*** (0.003) 0.009*** (0.002) 0.003 (0.006) -0.038*** (0.009) -0.013** (0.005) 
    0.149
*** (0.007) 0.123*** (0.009)  0.165*** (0.003) 0.100*** (0.002) 0.072*** (0.005) 0.083*** (0.017) 0.102*** (0.009) 
    0.036
*** (0.004) 0.022*** (0.005)  0.035*** (0.002) 0.022*** (0.002) 0.031*** (0.007) 0.016 (0.023) 0.010* (0.005) 
    -0.028
*** (0.007) 0.002 (0.005)  -0.042*** (0.003) 0.011*** (0.002) 0.018*** (0.004) 0.001 (0.012) 0.002 (0.006) 
      -0.010
* (0.005)  0.014*** (0.002) -0.019*** (0.002) -0.034*** (0.004) -0.018** (0.007) 0.005 (0.005) 
      -0.012
*** (0.004)  -0.008*** (0.002) -0.022*** (0.002) -0.016*** (0.004) -0.021*** (0.008) -0.012*** (0.004) 
         -0.003 (0.002) 0.015
*** (0.002) -0.036*** (0.003) -0.028*** (0.004) -0.018*** (0.005) 
           -0.008
*** (0.002) -0.001 (0.005) -0.014 (0.016) 0.072*** (0.006) 
           0.069
*** (0.002) 0.073*** (0.005) 0.076*** (0.021) -0.193*** (0.013) 
    -0.235*** (0.007) -0.165
*** (0.014)  0.067*** (0.005) 0.040*** (0.004) 0.079*** (0.016) -0.008 (0.020) -0.048*** (0.018) 
    -0.111*** (0.010) -0.030
*** (0.007)  0.009 (0.006) 0.116*** (0.006) -0.007 (0.012) 0.005 (0.016) -0.066*** (0.014) 
    -0.106*** (0.018) -0.050
*** (0.006)  0.295*** (0.011) 0.278*** (0.006) 0.206*** (0.014) 0.100* (0.060) 0.042* (0.022) 
    -0.081*** (0.009) -0.036
*** (0.005)  0.052*** (0.008) 0.125*** (0.004) 0.125*** (0.011) 0.089* (0.050) 0.161*** (0.022) 
    -0.078*** (0.009) -0.020
*** (0.005)  0.158*** (0.005) 0.209*** (0.005) 0.117*** (0.009) 0.120*** (0.039) 0.016 (0.010) 
    -0.037*** (0.010) 0.002 (0.005)  0.158
*** (0.008) 0.212*** (0.005) 0.184*** (0.012) 0.119*** (0.035) 0.038*** (0.011) 
    0.225*** (0.006) 0.170
*** (0.009)  0.190*** (0.004) 0.202*** (0.005) 0.224*** (0.009) 0.260*** (0.020) 0.190*** (0.021) 
    0.029*** (0.007)    0.144
*** (0.004) 0.143*** (0.005) 0.144*** (0.009) 0.159*** (0.039) 0.142*** (0.013) 
           0.171
*** (0.004) 0.153*** (0.011) 0.173*** (0.029) 0.066*** (0.011) 
           0.163
*** (0.003) 0.137*** (0.008) 0.195*** (0.016) 0.149*** (0.009) 
            -0.011
*** (0.004)   0.135*** (0.021)   
                0.043
* (0.023)   
                0.080
*** (0.023)   
 
Table G1 (continued) 
    -0.054*** (0.010) -0.031* (0.018)  -0.075
*** (0.009) -0.006* (0.003) -0.056*** (0.016) 0.048* (0.025) 0.061*** (0.010) 
    -0.106*** (0.008) -0.051*** (0.019)  -0.144
*** (0.003) -0.018*** (0.003) -0.047*** (0.009) -0.091** (0.037) -0.109*** (0.011) 
    0.152*** (0.022) 0.055** (0.022)  0.188
*** (0.009) 0.127*** (0.006) 0.022*** (0.008) -0.085*** (0.032) -0.064*** (0.009) 
    0.252*** (0.016) 0.135*** (0.018)  0.250
*** (0.006) 0.283*** (0.007) 0.209*** (0.017) 0.077** (0.037) 0.031* (0.018) 
    0.224*** (0.009) -0.003 (0.015)  0.213
*** (0.005) 0.257*** (0.005) 0.238*** (0.011) 0.117*** (0.012) 0.128*** (0.018) 
    0.262*** (0.007) 0.023* (0.014)  0.266
*** (0.006) 0.267*** (0.005) 0.258*** (0.010) 0.234*** (0.024) 0.196*** (0.021) 
    0.185*** (0.007) 0.171*** (0.016)  0.188
*** (0.004) 0.22*** (0.005) 0.244*** (0.011) 0.209*** (0.019) 0.135*** (0.011) 
    0.125*** (0.005)    0.121
*** (0.003) 0.167*** (0.005) 0.155*** (0.008) 0.219*** (0.017) 0.152*** (0.009) 
           0.102
*** (0.003) 0.119*** (0.008) 0.197*** (0.020) 0.164*** (0.013) 
           0.077
*** (0.003) 0.060*** (0.008) 0.121*** (0.020) 0.053*** (0.007) 
            0.123
*** (0.004)   0.067** (0.032)   
                0.109
*** (0.030)   
                0.125
*** (0.020)   
   -0.109*** (0.019) -0.124*** (0.020)  -0.114*** (0.025) -0.070*** (0.010) -0.095*** (0.016) -0.178*** (0.042) -0.099*** (0.022) 
   -0.108*** (0.019) -0.124*** (0.020)  -0.112*** (0.025) -0.071*** (0.010) -0.097*** (0.016) -0.182*** (0.042) -0.101*** (0.021) 
   0.500*** (0.097) 0.711*** (0.121)  0.561*** (0.104) 0.653*** (0.095) 0.519*** (0.138) 0.232*** (0.135) 0.748*** (0.162) 
   0.489*** (0.098) 0.671*** (0.115)  0.562*** (0.105) 0.608*** (0.088) 0.501*** (0.135) 0.219*** (0.122) 0.716*** (0.153) 
    0.034*** (0.002) 0.052*** (0.005)  0.041*** (0.003) 0.028*** (0.001) 0.030*** (0.004) 0.014** (0.011) 0.045*** (0.004) 
Obs.  
(N x T) 
60,002 
(38 x 1,579) 
47,370 
(30 x 1,579) 
 233,692 
(148 x 1,579) 
108,951 
(69 x 1,579) 
39,475 
(25 x 1,579) 
7,895 
(5 x 1,579) 
36,317 
(23 x 1,579) 
     449.90 228.52  942.40 864.13 465.01 96439.97 181.10 
H0         3.51 [0.061] 17.86 [0.000]  0.08 [0.776] 30.84 [0.000] 8.59 [0.003] 0.79 [0.375] 6.46 [0.011] 
H0       0.47 [0.492] 1.93 [0.165]  7.09 [0.008] 16.67 [0.000] 23.89 [0.000] 342.66 [0.000] 2.18 [0.139] 
  
 
Table G1 (continued) 
Catalonia 
 Expensive Cheap  Repsol Cepsa BP Other brands,  expensive 
Other brands,  
cheap 
   -0.192*** (0.006) -0.035*** (0.012)  -0.161*** (0.003) -0.189*** (0.005) -0.155*** (0.023) -0.096
*** (0.009) -0.025** (0.011) 
   -0.064*** (0.004) 0.036*** (0.010)  -0.040*** (0.003) -0.041*** (0.003) -0.032** (0.015) 0.003 (0.005) 0.042
*** (0.010) 
   -0.072*** (0.003) 0.001 (0.007)  -0.053*** (0.003) -0.046*** (0.002) -0.039*** (0.013) -0.029
*** (0.007) 0.005 (0.007) 
   -0.044*** (0.003) 0.001 (0.011)  -0.009*** (0.002) -0.025*** (0.002) -0.034** (0.015) -0.012
** (0.006) 0.001 (0.012) 
   -0.045*** (0.003) 0.005 (0.005)  -0.052*** (0.002) -0.041*** (0.003) -0.029*** (0.008) -0.009
** (0.004) 0.008 (0.005) 
   -0.022*** (0.002) 0.014*** (0.004)  -0.033*** (0.002) -0.011*** (0.002) 0.007 (0.007) -0.012
*** (0.003) 0.015*** (0.004) 
   0.192*** (0.006) 0.065*** (0.013)  0.226*** (0.004) 0.184*** (0.003) 0.182*** (0.028) 0.166
*** (0.014) 0.058*** (0.012) 
   0.038*** (0.003) 0.017*** (0.005)  0.019*** (0.002) 0.056*** (0.003) 0.029** (0.012) 0.021
*** (0.005) 0.019*** (0.005) 
   -0.015*** (0.002) 0.014*** (0.004)  -0.007*** (0.002) -0.035*** (0.002) -0.002 (0.013) -0.012
*** (0.002) 0.015*** (0.004) 
    -0.052*** (0.003) 0.006 (0.007)  -0.083*** (0.002) -0.046*** (0.003) 0.001 (0.005) -0.027
*** (0.004) 0.010* (0.005) 
    -0.032*** (0.002) 0.007 (0.007)  -0.038*** (0.002) -0.041*** (0.003) -0.026*** (0.005) -0.027
*** (0.005) 0.010 (0.006) 
    -0.042*** (0.002) 0.010* (0.006)  -0.030*** (0.002) -0.060*** (0.002) 0.005 (0.006) -0.017
*** (0.004) 0.012** (0.006) 
    -0.023*** (0.003) 0.001 (0.003)  -0.044*** (0.002) 0.011*** (0.002) -0.031 (0.022) -0.015
*** (0.005) 0.001 (0.003) 
    0.133*** (0.004) 0.039*** (0.012)  0.175*** (0.003) 0.117*** (0.003) 0.088*** (0.021) 0.113
*** (0.010) 0.035*** (0.012) 
    0.042*** (0.002) 0.004 (0.004)  0.035*** (0.002) 0.037*** (0.002) 0.027** (0.012) 0.031
*** (0.004) 0.004 (0.004) 
    -0.020*** (0.003) -0.005 (0.004)  -0.054*** (0.002) -0.001 (0.001) 0.002 (0.011) -0.007
* (0.004) -0.003 (0.002) 
    -0.009*** (0.003) 0.001 (0.005)  0.017*** (0.002)   -0.021* (0.013)   -0.002 (0.004) 
    -0.008
*** (0.002)        -0.019*** (0.006)     
             -0.017 (0.013)     
             -0.002 (0.007)     
             0.093
*** (0.013)     
    0.066*** (0.006) -0.001 (0.008)  0.073*** (0.004) 0.087*** (0.004) -0.052 (0.036) -0.006 (0.011) -0.010 (0.007) 
    0.012* (0.007) -0.050*** (0.012)  -0.020*** (0.004) 0.078*** (0.005) -0.036 (0.024) -0.100
*** (0.009) -0.059*** (0.009) 
    0.201*** (0.013) 0.006 (0.017)  0.280*** (0.007) 0.225*** (0.008) 0.012 (0.062) -0.027
* (0.015) -0.008 (0.011) 
    0.055*** (0.006) 0.009 (0.016)  -0.028*** (0.005) 0.009** (0.004) 0.147*** (0.026) 0.083
*** (0.015) 0.014 (0.017) 
    0.083*** (0.008) -0.022* (0.011)  0.108*** (0.004) 0.098*** (0.005) 0.001 (0.033) -0.056
*** (0.011) -0.029*** (0.011) 
    0.090*** (0.007) 0.020 (0.015)  0.141*** (0.004) 0.106*** (0.004) 0.028 (0.056) -0.007 (0.009)   
    0.176
*** (0.005)        0.192*** (0.015)     
    -0.025*** (0.007) 0.040*** (0.013)  -0.122*** (0.004) -0.021*** (0.004) 0.061 (0.051) 0.041
*** (0.011) 0.046*** (0.012) 
    -0.131*** (0.006) -0.095*** (0.010)  -0.173*** (0.004) -0.07*** (0.005) -0.161*** (0.026) -0.14
*** (0.01) -0.099*** (0.011) 
    0.081*** (0.013) -0.026 (0.018)  0.203*** (0.005) 0.049*** (0.005) -0.089*** (0.034) -0.122
*** (0.015) -0.045*** (0.015) 
    0.193*** (0.011) -0.001 (0.018)  0.231*** (0.005) 0.235*** (0.008) 0.053 (0.070) 0.015 (0.017) -0.018 (0.014) 
 
 
Table G1 (continued) 
    0.177*** (0.007) 0.014 (0.012)  0.179*** (0.004) 0.190*** (0.006) 0.156*** (0.027) 0.063*** (0.013) 0.009 (0.010) 
    0.217*** (0.006) 0.064*** (0.017)  0.229*** (0.005) 0.178*** (0.006) 0.178*** (0.014) 0.172*** (0.012)   
    0.163
*** (0.005)        0.126*** (0.017)     
   -0.116*** (0.025) -0.088*** (0.006)  -0.110*** (0.011) -0.136** (0.054) -0.105*** (0.007) -0.159*** (0.015) -0.106*** (0.007) 
   -0.117*** (0.025) -0.087*** (0.006)  -0.109*** (0.011) -0.135** (0.054) 0.100*** (0.010) -0.162*** (0.015) -0.078*** (0.006) 
   0.814*** (0.177) 1.060***  (0.016)  0.838*** (0.090) 0.746*** (0.298) 1.052*** (0.049) 0.746** (0.289) 1.065*** (0.016) 
   0.784*** (0.170) 0.987***   (0.008)  0.852*** (0.092) 0.734*** (0.295) 0.952*** (0.037) 0.734** (0.295) 0.987*** (0.008) 
  0.057*** (0.002) 0.559*** (0.008)  0.056*** (0.002) 0.061*** (0.002) 0.063*** (0.006) 0.061*** (0.002) 0.557*** (0.008) 
Obs.  
(N x T) 
214,744 
(136 x 1,579) 
33,159 
(21 x 1,579) 
 208,428 
(132 x 1,579) 
132,636 
(84 x 1,579) 
7,895 
(5 x 1,579) 
64,739 
(41 x 1,579) 
31,580 
(20 x 1,579) 
     1246.84 487.83  1219.74 1126.64 1996.05 695.53 524.15 
H0         10.83 [0.001] 16.12 [0.000]  4.51 [0.034] 11.98 [0.000] 16.62 [0.000] 113.89 [0.000] 19.10 [0.000] 
H0       0.06 [0.807] 2.75 [0.097]  4.12 [0.043] 40.67 [0.000] 0.29 [0.591] 68.73 [0.000] 1.74 [0.187] 
Standard errors are in parenthesis and p-values are reported in brackets. The optimal lag length has been selected by minimizing the AIC. We denote ***, **, * to indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Regressions include step dummy variables to control for changes in the Spanish VAT rate on fuels (1st June 
2010 and 1st September 2012) and the hydrocarbon special tax in Catalonia (1st April 2012). N and T refer, respectively, to the cross-sectional and temporal observations of the 
panel data. 
Figure 1. Dynamic responses of retail price dispersion at regional level 
a) Madrid 
 
b)  Catalonia 
 
The solid black and grey lines represent the cumulative response of retail price dispersion to a unit positive 













































b)  Catalonia 
 
The solid black and grey lines represent the cumulative response of retail price dispersion to a unit 
positive and negative change in wholesale prices, respectively. Dashed lines denote their corresponding 
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Figure 3. Response of retail prices for expensive and cheap stations at regional level 
 





The increasing and decreasing solid lines represent the cumulative retail price responses to a unit positive 
and negative change in wholesale prices, respectively. The dark red (black) colors correspond to those 
petrol stations denoted as expensive (cheap) because their daily prices are above (below) the daily cross-
sectional mean of each region during equal or more than 90% of days covering the sample period. Dashed 
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Figure 4. Response of retail prices for Repsol, Cepsa, BP, and other expensive and 










The increasing and decreasing solid lines represent the cumulative retail price responses to a unit positive 
and negative change in wholesale prices, respectively. On the one hand, light red, blue and green color 
lines correspond respectively to those petrol stations belonging to Repsol, Cepsa, and BP. On the other 
hand, dark grey (light grey) color lines correspond to the remaining gas stations of the sample that are 
denoted as expensive (cheap) prices because their daily prices are above (below) the daily cross-sectional 
mean of each region during equal or more than 90% of days covering the sample period. Dashed lines 























































Figure 5. Robustness check of the response of retail prices from an extended version of 





The increasing and decreasing solid lines represent the cumulative retail price responses to a unit positive 
and negative change in wholesale prices, respectively. At the top of the Figure, dark red and black color 
lines correspond respectively to expensive and cheap stations at regional level. At the bottom of the Figure, 
bright red, blue and green color lines refer respectively to those petrol stations belonging to Repsol, Cepsa, 
and BP; while black (grey) color lines correspond to the remaining gas stations of the sample that are 
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Figure B1. Dynamic responses of retail price dispersion at regional level (based on the 






The solid black and grey lines represent the cumulative response of retail price dispersion to a unit positive 
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The solid lines represent the cumulative retail price responses to a unit positive and negative change in 
wholesale prices, respectively. The dark red (black) colors correspond to those petrol stations denoted as 
expensive (cheap) because their daily prices are above (below) the daily cross-sectional mean of each city 
or ZIP-code during equal or more than 90% of days covering the sample period. Dashed lines symbolize 
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Expensive and cheap stations at ZIP-code 
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Appendix A. Diesel fuel taxes in Spain 
Diesel fuel prices in Spain are levied by a general indirect tax on consumption and a set 
of excise duties. On the one hand, the indirect tax on consumption corresponds to the 
value added tax (VAT), which presents a common rate to the entire territory ranging 
from 16% to 21% during the analyzed period. On the other hand, the excise duties are 
composed by three special hydrocarbon taxes: a general section (0.307 €/litres), a State 
section (0.024 €/litres) and a regional section, which can differ between Madrid and 
Catalonia in accordance to the criteria of the autonomous governments. Table A1 
summarises the Spanish taxation structure for diesel fuel from 1st May 2010 to 26th 
August 2014. 
[Please, insert Table A1 about here] 
According to previous information, fuel taxes have been excluded from retail prices by 
using the following equation: 
     
   
      
                                                        
where      represents the net-of-tax retail price for each seller   and each time period  , 




Appendix B. Estimates from Eq. (1) based on fixed effects 
 [Please, insert here Figure B1] 
Appendix C. Stationarity properties of the alternative measures of price dispersion  
Table C1 reports the results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron unit 
root tests applied to the citywide dispersion, ZIP-code dispersion and the standard 
deviation of daily retail prices. As can be seen, they suggest that these measures of price 
dispersion in Madrid and Catalonia are stationary. Therefore, similarly than before, we 
cannot assume the existence of a long-run relationship between the standard deviation 
of retail prices and the wholesale price. 
[Please, insert Table C1 about here] 
  
Appendix D. Robustness check for Eq. (1) 
[Please, insert here Table D1]
Appendix E. Stationary properties of panel data on retail prices 
The Table E1 reports the results for the Breitung and Das (2005) panel unit root tests on 
retail prices. As can be seen, the null hypothesis of non-stationarity cannot be rejected 
for the level of the variable in any case. However, when we take first differences, the 
null hypothesis of non-stationarity is rejected at the 1% level of significance. Then, test 
results suggest that retail prices are integrated of order one, I(1), both in Madrid and 
Catalonia. 
[Please, insert Table E1 about here] 
  
Appendix F. Expensive and cheap stations at city and zip-code level 
[Please, insert here Figure F1] 
 
Appendix G. Robustness check for Eq. (2) 
[Please, insert here Table G1] 
